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ARTICLES
STANDING OF INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTS
IN PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION
Matthew I. Hall*
Unless the plaintiff has a personal stake in the outcome, Article III of the
United States Constitution requires federal courts to dismiss a plaintiff’s
claim for lack of standing. That much is clearly established by decades of
precedent. Less understood, however, is the degree to which Article III also
requires defendants to possess a personal stake. The significance of
defendant standing often goes unnoticed in case law and scholarship,
because the standing of the defendant in most lawsuits is readily apparent:
any defendant against whom the plaintiff seeks a remedy has a personal
interest in defending against the plaintiff’s claim.
But the issue of standing to defend takes on outsized importance when
third parties who are not targeted by the plaintiff’s requested remedy seek
leave to intervene in order to oppose the plaintiff’s claim for relief. In
cases featuring intervenor-defendants—often cases that concern important
issues of public law—the personal-stake requirement becomes a real and
not merely theoretical concern for the defendant. The problem is well
illustrated by pending cases that address the constitutionality of
California’s Proposition 8 and the federal Defense of Marriage Act. In
each case, the executive branch officials named as defendants declined to
defend the challenged law, prompting a nonparty with a questionable
personal stake to seek to intervene to defend against a plaintiff’s claim.
The prevailing plaintiff-centered model of standing does not lend itself
readily to assessing whether such volunteer defendants have an interest
sufficient to create a case or controversy.
This Article develops a model of defendant standing based on the
functions that standing doctrine is intended to serve, and derived from the
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grateful to Lucas Bradley and Brittany Cambre for excellent research assistance, and to
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cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court has considered the personal stake of
defendants under Article III. Under this model, absent a traditional injury
in fact, intervenor standing to defend in public law litigation is appropriate
only where state or federal law confers on the intervenor the authority to
represent the government’s interest. This Article then illustrates the
application of that model in the Proposition 8 and DOMA cases, and
concludes that the intervenors in the Proposition 8 litigation do have
standing to defend, while the intervenors in the DOMA litigation do not.
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INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of standing is generally understood to limit the ability of
plaintiffs to seek relief in federal court. Courts attribute the doctrine to
Article III’s restriction of federal jurisdiction to “Cases” and
“Controversies,” and the need to maintain a proper balance of power among
the three branches of the federal government. What has gone largely
unnoticed in the decades since the Supreme Court began to develop the
standing doctrine is the degree to which Article III restricts who may defend
against a claim in federal court. This aspect of standing doctrine is so
under-appreciated that some courts and scholars have even asserted,
incorrectly, that Article III’s standing restrictions apply only to plaintiffs,
while other courts have used aspects of the plaintiff standing doctrine to
enforce limits on defendant standing sub rosa.1
Pending cases addressing the constitutionality of California’s Proposition
8, 2 and the federal Defense of Marriage Act 3 (DOMA) illustrate the
circumstances in which issues of defendant standing may be contested, and
they highlight the inadequacy of our plaintiff-centered model of standing to
guide courts to sensible results in such cases. In both the Proposition 8 and
DOMA cases, the executive branch officials named as defendants declined
to defend the challenged law in whole or in part, prompting a nonparty to
seek to intervene to contest the plaintiff’s claims. 4 This unusual procedural
posture raises the question whether the existence of an Article III case or
controversy depends on a showing that the defendant, as well as the
plaintiff, has a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation. If, as many
observers expect, the Proposition 8 and DOMA cases reach the Supreme
Court, the highly significant merits questions that those cases raise may turn

1. See infra Part II.B.
2. See Perry v. Brown, --- F.3d ----, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713 (9th
Cir. Feb. 7, 2012).
3. DOMA has been challenged in a number of pending actions in different federal
courts. See, e.g., In re Levenson, 587 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 2009); Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange,
447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006); Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1178
(N.D. Cal. 2011); Windsor v. United States, No. 10-civ-8435 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 9, 2010);
Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F.
Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004); see
also infra Part II.C.
4. In the Proposition 8 litigation, the sponsors of the ballot initiative sought to defend
the measure. In several pending DOMA cases, certain members of the United States
Congress have sought to intervene to defend the constitutionality of DOMA after Attorney
General Eric Holder announced that the Department of Justice would no longer defend
section 3 of DOMA in court. See infra Part II.C.
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on the precise manner in which Article III restricts who may defend a claim
in federal court.
Problems of defendant standing have largely escaped notice because they
arise infrequently. In most cases, the defendant’s personal stake is perfectly
clear. When a plaintiff demands relief against a defendant—usually in the
form of damages or an injunction—the defendant’s exposure to the risk of
an adverse judgment suffices to create standing to defend. 5 Contested
issues of defendant standing thus arise only in unusual circumstances: (1)
in the trial court, when nonparties seek to be heard through intervention,
and (2) on appeal, when parties against whom no relief was ordered seek to
overturn the trial court’s judgment. Because these circumstances occur
most commonly in public law cases with significant policy implications,
one might expect to find serious studies of defendant standing in the case
law and the academic literature. In fact, however, the topic has been all but
ignored. Many law review articles have addressed standing to sue, but not
one has comprehensively considered the question of how standing doctrine
limits who may defend a claim. 6 No less problematically, the courts that
have addressed this subject have developed no coherent theory and thus
have produced ill-considered and inconsistent outcomes.
This Article seeks to provide much-needed clarity in this neglected field
of standing doctrine. I argue that, without articulating a clear theoretical
basis for doing so, the Supreme Court has often treated the defendant’s
personal stake in the litigation as essential to the existence of a case or
controversy. But the Court has done so in a confused and haphazard
fashion, thus providing insufficient guidance to lower courts and creating an
added measure of mischief in cases that concern what I call volunteer
defendants—that is, parties not sued by the plaintiff, who seek to intervene
as defendants. I respond to these problems by proposing a rubric for
analyzing issues of defendant standing in public law cases, and
demonstrating its superiority to current doctrine in terms of both theoretical
consistency and ease of application.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I identifies the core requirements
of a “case or controversy” under Article III as developed in the many cases
that explore whether the plaintiff has standing to maintain an action. Part II
argues that Article III’s Cases or Controversies Clause limits not only who
may bring a claim, but who may defend it. It also explains why standing to
defend is rarely litigated, and illustrates the circumstances under which
defendant standing issues can arise, by examining two high-profile cases
that address the constitutionality of laws that prohibit marriage between
individuals of the same sex. Part III discusses the Court’s past application
of both Article II and Article III standing principles to defendants, critiques
the Court’s under-theorized approach, and advances a new model for
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. For a thoughtful discussion of some of these issues in the context of standing to
appeal, see Joan Steinman, Shining a Light in a Dim Corner: Standing to Appeal and the
Right to Defend a Judgment in the Federal Courts, 38 GA. L. REV. 813 (2004).
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applying justiciability doctrine to defendants. Finally, Part IV applies the
proposed test for defendant standing to the pending Proposition 8 and
Defense of Marriage Act litigation, and demonstrates that the Proposition 8
intervenors have standing to defend, while the DOMA intervenors do not.
I. CONVENTIONAL STANDING DOCTRINE
This part provides context for the problem of defendant standing by
describing how the Cases or Controversies Clause applies in the more usual
case to restrict the standing of plaintiffs to assert particular claims for relief.
A. Plaintiff Standing
Standing doctrine is commonly said to be derived from Article III of the
U.S. Constitution, which extends federal jurisdiction only to specified
categories of “Cases” and “Controversies.” 7 The Supreme Court has
construed this jurisdictional grant to limit federal jurisdiction to disputes in
which a plaintiff demonstrates a sufficient “personal stake” in the outcome.8
More specifically, standing doctrine, in its most common application,
requires the plaintiff to “‘show that he personally . . . suffered some actual
or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the
defendant’ and that the injury ‘fairly can be traced to the challenged action’
and ‘is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.’” 9
The Court has also declared that standing does not exist when “the
asserted harm is a ‘generalized grievance’ shared in substantially equal
measure by all or a large class of citizens.” 10 A party’s alleged injury that
involves nothing more than “harm to his and every citizen’s interest in
proper application of the Constitution and laws” generally is insufficient to
support standing. 11 Thus, when the injury alleged is an injury to the desire
7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
8. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) (stating that “the
standing question in its Art. III aspect ‘is whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of federal-court
jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his behalf’” (quoting
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975))).
9. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (citations omitted); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751
(1984)).
10. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573
(1992).
11. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573; see also Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?
Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 181, 200–01 (1992)
(arguing that the Court in Lujan treated the ban on generalized grievances as constitutional in
nature, and emphasized “that Article III requires something more than [a request for] relief
that no more directly and tangibly benefits [the plaintiff] than it does the public at large”).
The extent to which Lujan transformed the prohibition on generalized grievances into a
constitutional, rather than a prudential, aspect of standing doctrine has been the subject of
some disagreement. Compare Sunstein, supra, with David J. Weiner, The New Law of
Legislative Standing, 54 STAN. L. REV. 205, 222–24 (2001).
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of a citizen or taxpayer to have the government simply follow the law,
standing is absent—in part because “the political process, rather than the
judicial process, may provide the more appropriate remedy.” 12 When an
asserted injury “arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation
(or lack of regulation) of someone else . . . . [S]tanding is not precluded,
but it is ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.”13
The Court, and some scholars, have also found support for aspects of
standing doctrine in Article II of the Constitution.14 Article II confers the
executive power on the President,15 and provides that the President “shall
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”16 Steven Calabresi and
Kevin Rhodes, among others, have argued that the President must have
control and supervision over all exercises of discretionary executive
power. 17 The Court has never gone so far,18 but it has held that standing
12. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998).
13. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562 (citing Allen, 468 U.S. at 758).
14. See, e.g., id. at 577 (“To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public
interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable in
the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief
Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)); Allen, 468 U.S. at 761 (“The
Constitution . . . assigns to the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial Branch, the duty to
‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)); Edward
A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal Prosecutions Show that
Standing Doctrine Is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2239,
2256 (1999) (arguing that the question of “[w]ho can constitutionally be empowered to
represent . . . public interests in court” is a question “of the proper interpretation, not of
Article III or Article I, but of Article II.”); Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen
Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1793, 1793–96, 1804–08 (1993) (arguing that
Article II requires presidential control of law enforcement activities, and bars suits against
the federal government by individuals who lack an “individuated interest”); see also Steven
G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural
Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1215 (1992).
15. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
17. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 595 (1994) (“[A]ll ‘executive power’ found in the Constitution
is only vested in one individual, the President. If anyone else is ever to exercise federal
executive power, it must be as a result of the explicit or tacit delegation and approval of the
President . . . .”); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 14, at 1165, 1215 (arguing that “[t]he text
and structure of Article II compel the conclusion that the President retains supervisory
control over all officers exercising executive power”); see also Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting
the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the
Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 72–80 (1990); Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v.
Olson: A Formalistic Perspective on Why the Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313,
316, 347–54 (1989). This “unitary executive” view of Article II has inspired significant
criticism, on both doctrinal and historical grounds. See, e.g., Morton Rosenberg, Congress’s
Prerogative over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the
Reagan Administration’s Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627, 634
(1989); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 609–50 (1984) (criticizing the unitary executive
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doctrine functions, in part, to protect executive power by limiting the
enforcement of federal law by litigants not subject to the control of the
President. 19 Tara Grove has recently offered an insightful alternative
account of the Article II basis for standing doctrine, arguing that standing
protects individual liberty against arbitrary and unchecked exercises of
prosecutorial discretion by private actors.20 Despite their differences, all of
the Article II theories of standing share—with one another and with Article
III treatments of standing doctrine—a focus on the standing of plaintiffs.21
B. Legislative Standing
The Court has developed a specialized set of standing rules to govern
cases in which a legislator seeks either to assert or to defend claims
addressing either the constitutionality of a law or the legality of executive
action. Given the frequency with which legislators seek to intervene in
public law cases, the rules governing legislative standing are especially
significant in assessing the standing of intervenor-defendants. The

theory on historical grounds); id. at 583–86 (criticizing it on structural and doctrinal
grounds); Cass R. Sunstein, Article II Revisionism, 92 MICH. L. REV. 131, 137–38 (1993);
Sunstein, supra note 11, at 211–14.
18. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 690 n.29 (1987) (rejecting the dissent’s
unitary executive theory as requiring “an extrapolation from general constitutional language
which we think is more than the text will bear”); see also Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note
14, at 1208 (noting that in Morrison, “seven Justices rejected Chief Justice Taft’s and Justice
Scalia’s unitary executive construction of Article II”).
19. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (discussing the role of standing doctrine in
protecting executive power from usurpation by Congress and the judiciary); see also Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
20. See Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article II Nondelegation Doctrine, 11 U.
PENN. J. CONST. L. 781, 801–03 (2009); see also Jason Lynch, Federalism, Separation of
Powers, and the Role of State Attorneys General in Multistate Litigation, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1998, 2029 (2001) (“Instances of the execution of federal law by those outside the
direct control of the President—such as citizens’ suit provisions in federal statutes and state
implementation of federal regulatory standards—have touched off a vigorous judicial and
academic debate.”); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1367, 1445 (2003) (“Private delegates’ exemption from constitutional constraints means that
they can wield these government powers in ways that raise serious abuse of power
concerns.”); Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?,
102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 731 (2004) (discussing qui tam actions, and noting “obvious dangers
in a system that permits prosecutorial discretion to reside in each of 250 million autonomous
decisionmakers”).
21. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary
Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 55–57 (1995) (describing limitations on “standing to sue” as
a device to protect the Executive Branch from usurpation of power by the judiciary,
Congress, and lawyers representing private plaintiffs); Grove, supra note 20, at 789 (stating
that the focus in Article II standing inquiry “should not be on the Executive Branch, but on
the private plaintiff”) (emphasis added); see also infra Part II.B.
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foundational cases in this area are Coleman v. Miller 22 and Raines v.
Byrd. 23
In Coleman, a group of Kansas state legislators challenged the state
legislature’s ratification of the proposed Child Labor Amendment to the
United States Constitution. 24 The state Senate had deadlocked on the
amendment, and the Lieutenant Governor, as presiding officer, cast a tiebreaking vote in favor of ratification.25 The claim of the objecting state
legislators rested on the argument that the Lieutenant Governor did not have
the power to break a tie in relation to proposed federal constitutional
amendments. 26 The Court found that the objectors had standing, noting that
their “votes against ratification have been overridden and virtually held for
naught[,] although if they are right in their contentions their votes would
have been sufficient to defeat ratification.”27 The Court held that these
allegations established “a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining
the effectiveness of their votes.” 28 Importantly, the Court contrasted this
basis for standing with the right of every citizen “‘to require that the
Government be administered according to law,’” which did not entitle
private citizens to sue. 29
Fifty-eight years later, the Court refined the rule of Coleman in Raines v.
Byrd. In that case, several federal legislators brought an action in which
they asked the Court to invalidate the Line Item Veto Act of 1996,30
claiming that the Act violated the grant of legislative power to Congress by
permitting the President effectively to amend spending laws by removing
particular appropriations enacted by Congress. 31 The Court, with Chief
Justice Rehnquist writing, held that the plaintiffs lacked “a sufficient
‘personal stake’” in the dispute, and had neither suffered a concrete
personal injury, nor a cognizable institutional injury. 32
The Court first held that the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged a
personal injury. Rather, they had alleged an institutional injury to the
power of Congress to craft legislation.33 “Their claim is that the Act causes
a type of institutional injury . . . which necessarily damages all Members of
Congress and both Houses of Congress equally.” 34 The Court thus
distinguished Raines from an earlier case, Powell v. McCormack, in which
22. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
23. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
24. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 435–36.
25. Id. at 436.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 438.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 440 (quoting Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922)).
30. 2 U.S.C. § 691 (1996).
31. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 816 (1997). The plaintiffs were eventually proved
right on the merits, when the Court invalidated the Act the following year. See Clinton v.
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
32. Raines, 521 U.S. at 830.
33. Id. at 825.
34. Id. at 821.
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standing had been premised on Congressman Adam Clayton Powell’s
allegation that he had been “singled out for specially unfavorable treatment”
by other members of Congress, who had refused to seat him after his
election. 35
Next, the Court held that the Raines plaintiffs, unlike the plaintiffs in
Coleman, could not establish standing based on an institutional injury.
Coleman stood “for the proposition that legislators whose votes would have
been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act have standing
to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into effect),
on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified.”36 Raines
was different, the Court held, because the plaintiffs had not alleged “that
they voted for a specific bill, that there were sufficient votes to pass the bill,
and that the bill was nonetheless deemed defeated.” 37 Thus, under Raines,
legislative standing would seem to exist only when a specific legislative
vote is “completely nullified,”38 as when a legislative act goes into effect
(or does not go into effect) despite the legislator-plaintiff having cast a vote
that was “sufficient to defeat (or enact)” the act. 39
Finally, Justice Souter, in his concurrence, explained the Court’s narrow
view of legislative standing by reference to foundational separation-ofpowers concerns. He suggested that disputes of the sort at issue in Raines
were better suited to resolution by the political branches, in part because of
the risk to the Court’s reputation if it were perceived as taking sides in a
dispute between the President and Congress.40 Raines thus represents the
triumph of a view that Justice Scalia had been articulating for many years:
that because legislative standing cases tend to involve “purely
intragovernmental dispute[s] . . . concerning the proper workings of [the
political branches] under the Constitution,” 41 judicial intervention in such
disputes poses unacceptably serious threats to the legitimacy of the Court.42
Proponents of a strong view of legislative standing often cite a passage in
INS v. Chadha in which the Supreme Court stated: “We have long held that
35. Id. (discussing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)).
36. Id. at 823.
37. Id. at 824.
38. Id. at 823.
39. Id.; see also Anthony Clark Arend & Catherine B. Lotrionte, Congress Goes to
Court: The Past, Present, and Future of Legislator Standing, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
209, 258 (2001); Weiner, supra note 11, at 206.
40. Raines, 521 U.S. at 833 (Souter, J., concurring).
41. Moore v. U.S. House of Reps., 733 F.2d 946, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
42. Id. As Justice Scalia observed while still serving on the D.C. Circuit, a legislative
suit is not
between two individuals regarding action taken by them in their private capacities;
nor a suit between an individual and an officer of one or another Branch of
government regarding the effect of a governmental act or decree upon the
individual’s private activities.
It is a purely intragovernmental
dispute . . . concerning the proper workings of the Legislative Branch under the
Constitution.
Id.
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Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when an
agency of government, as a defendant charged with enforcing the statute,
agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional.”43
Taken out of context, that statement would appear to permit congressional
intervention in any case in which the Attorney General declines to defend
the constitutionality of a federal statute. But the Court has interpreted
Chadha far more narrowly.
In Chadha, a federal statutory provision that authorized either house of
Congress, by resolution of that house alone, to invalidate a decision by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to allow a particular
deportable alien to remain in the United States was challenged as a
violation of the separation of powers doctrine. The INS—represented by
the U.S. Attorney General—agreed with the petitioner alien’s claim that the
legislative veto provision was unconstitutional, and the Ninth Circuit
permitted Congress to intervene to defend the challenged statute. 44 The
Court permitted the intervention, and struck down the statute as a violation
of separation of powers.
Chadha thus involved a peculiar kind of statute—one that granted each
house of Congress the power to veto certain decisions of the Executive
Branch 45—and its holding regarding legislative standing has never been
extended beyond that narrow context. Indeed, the Court has since rejected
efforts to expand Chadha’s recognition of legislative standing to permit
intervention in any case involving Congress’s power vis-à-vis the President.
Denying legislative standing in Raines v. Byrd, the Court held that the
institutional injury to Congress effected by the Line Item Veto Act was
“wholly abstract and widely dispersed,” and thus could not support a claim
of institutional injury. 46 The same might be said of Congress’s interest in
defending the Defense of Marriage Act. The Court in Raines went on to
distinguish Chadha, noting that—under the broad view of that case urged
by the intervenors in Raines—any federal official would have standing to
challenge any law that reduced his or her authority relative to another
branch. 47 Although “[t]here would be nothing irrational about [such] a
system,” the Court said, “it is obviously not the regime that has obtained
under our Constitution to date.” 48 The federal judicial power does not
include “some amorphous general supervision of the operations of
government.” 49
43. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 939 (1983).
44. Id. at 923–28.
45. Id. at 923–25.
46. 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997); see also id. at 826 (“There is a vast difference between the
level of vote nullification at issue in Coleman and the abstract dilution of institutional
legislative power that is alleged here. To uphold standing here would require a drastic
extension of Coleman. We are unwilling to take that step.”).
47. Id. at 828.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 829 (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell,
J., concurring)).
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Chadha, in short, held only that Congress has a sufficient institutional
stake to support a case or controversy where it seeks to defend a power
granted to it by a statute. Chadha does not hold that Congress may
intervene to defend any challenged federal statute, and such a holding
would be irreconcilable with Raines, not to mention flatly at odds with the
exclusive grant of power to the Attorney General in 28 U.S.C. § 516. 50
C. Legislative Power to Confer Standing
The personal stake necessary to create an Article III case or controversy
may be created by legislative action. That is, either federal or state
lawmakers may create new rights and, to some extent, confer standing to
enforce them. Most obviously, state or federal law can create a “right,” the
violation of which constitutes an Article III injury. 51 When Congress
passed Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,52 for example, large numbers
of private plaintiffs were thereby granted standing to bring federal suits
alleging violations of their newly created statutory rights. Congress also
may, by statute, override prudential aspects of standing law, such as the
third-party standing doctrine. 53
This legislative power to create standing is not without limits, however.
The Court has often held that Congress may not ignore or override
constitutional standing constraints by, for instance, granting a right to sue to
someone who lacks a personal, concrete, and particularized injury. 54 “It is
settled that Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by
statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise
have standing.” 55 The Court has reasoned that this limit is an essential
bulwark of the separation of powers, stating:
Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation of
Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury requirement described in
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006) (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of
litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested,
and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the
direction of the Attorney General.”).
51. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (“The actual or threatened injury
required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating legal rights, the invasion
of which creates standing.’”); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973)
(“Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing,
even though no injury would exist without the statute.”); FMC Corp. v. Boesky, 852 F.2d
981, 993 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Properly pleaded violations of state-created legal rights, therefore,
must suffice to satisfy Article III’s injury requirement.”); see also Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,
Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J. 1141, 1146 (1993);
Michael E. Rosman, Standing Alone: Standing Under the Fair Housing Act, 60 MO. L. REV.
547, 556–67 (1995).
52. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701–18, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006).
53. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 (“Congress may grant an express right of action to persons
who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules.”).
54. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 (1992); Gladstone, Realtors v.
Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (“In no event, however, may Congress abrogate
the Art. III minima . . . .”); Nichol, supra note 51, at 1146.
55. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997).
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our cases, they would be discarding a principle fundamental to the
separate and distinct constitutional role of the Third Branch—one
of the essential elements that identifies those “Cases” and
“Controversies” that are the business of the courts rather than of
the political branches.56
II. THE PROBLEM OF STANDING TO DEFEND
Judicial 57 and scholarly 58 descriptions of standing typically focus on the
requirements that Article III imposes on plaintiffs. Although the Supreme
Court has also examined the defendant’s personal stake in determining
whether Article III jurisdiction exists, it has not articulated a coherent
theory to guide lower courts. As a result, few lower courts or scholars have
considered the other side of the standing coin—the degree to which Article
III requires defendants to possess a personal stake in the outcome of the
litigation.
This part critiques the common understanding of Article III standing
requirements as applicable only or primarily to plaintiffs, and demonstrates
that Article III’s Cases or Controversies Clause requires that defendants, as
well as plaintiffs, possess a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation.
It then uses ongoing federal litigation concerning the constitutionality of the
federal Defense of Marriage Act and California’s Proposition 8 to illustrate
that the application of standing requirements to defendants may have
significant consequences in public law litigation.
A. The Article III Requirement of Defendant Standing
The widespread acceptance of a largely one-sided view of Article III
standing—as limiting who may sue but not who may defend—is surprising
because both the text of Article III and the Court’s case law interpreting it
strongly support the argument that a defendant’s personal stake is a
necessary component of an Article III case or controversy. First, as a
textual matter, the Cases or Controversies Clause seems plainly to require
56. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576.
57. See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1442 (2011)
(“To state a case or controversy under Article III, a plaintiff must establish standing.”);
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (describing standing as “an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s
case”); Warth, 422 U.S. at 498 (“[T]he standing question is whether the plaintiff has ‘alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of
federal-court jurisdiction.”).
58. See, e.g., 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531, at 32 (3d ed. 2008) (“Many opinions refer to
‘standing’ in more general terms as a means of deciding whether the plaintiff has the claim
or right asserted.”); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3.1 (5th ed. 2007);
John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1220
(1993) (“One way federal courts ensure that they have a ‘real, earnest, and vital controversy’
before them is by testing the plaintiff’s standing to bring suit.”); Antonin Scalia, The
Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 881, 885 (1983) (“Standing requires . . . the allegation of some particularized injury to
the individual plaintiff.”).
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interested parties on both sides of the case. A one-sided “case” or
“controversy” is an oxymoron. Second, the few cases in which the Court
has considered the relevance of a defendant’s personal stake to federal
jurisdiction confirm that Article III requires defendants to possess a
personal stake in the outcome. The failure of lower courts to honor this
principle—or even to acknowledge it—is thus perplexing.
1. A “Case” or “Controversy” Requires Interested Adversaries
The terms “case” and “controversy,” in their nature, presuppose a dispute
with interested parties on both sides; 59 indeed, it makes little sense even to
speak of a case or a controversy with only one interested party. 60 In light of
this textual reality, it is not surprising that the Court has frequently
explained the restrictions imposed by the Cases or Controversies Clause in
terms of limiting federal courts to deciding “questions presented in an
adversary context,” 61 a phrase that suggests that both sides to a dispute
must possess an interest in the outcome. By imposing this requirement,
Article III ensures that the federal courts resolve only legal questions that
“emerge[] precisely framed and necessary for decision from a clash of
adversary argument . . . embracing conflicting and demanding interests.” 62
2. The Defendant Standing Requirement Hides in Plain Sight
If the Cases or Controversies Clause requires that defendants, as well as
plaintiffs, possess a personal stake in the matter, one might reasonably
wonder why defendant standing has received so little attention, and why it
is so rarely litigated. The answer is simple: doubts about a defendant’s
standing arise infrequently, because in the vast majority of cases, the
defendant’s standing is apparent. Any defendant against whom relief is
sought will always have standing to defend, because the exposure to risk of
59. See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997)
(“Standing to defend on appeal in the place of an original defendant, no less than standing to
sue, demands that the litigant possess ‘a direct stake in the outcome.’” (quoting Diamond v.
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986))); Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895) (dismissing
where there was “no actual controversy involving real and substantial rights between the
parties to the record”).
60. See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943) (dismissing where parties did not
appear genuinely adverse); Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129, 134–35 (1873)
(dismissing where the parties colluded to bring the case “for the purpose of obtaining the
opinion of th[e] court on important constitutional questions without the actual existence of
the facts on which such questions can alone arise”); cf. Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.)
251, 255 (1850) (holding that “any attempt, by a mere colorable dispute, to obtain the
opinion of the court upon a question of law which a party desires to know for his own
interest or his own purposes, when there is no real and substantial controversy between those
who appear as adverse parties to the suit, is an abuse which courts of justice have always
reprehended, and treated as a punishable contempt of court”).
61. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968); see also, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
204 (1962) (standing ensures “concrete adverseness”).
62. Flast, 392 U.S. at 96–97 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Freuhauf, 365
U.S. 146, 157 (1961)).
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injury from an adverse judgment is a sufficient personal stake to satisfy
Article III. 63 This is so because the Court has recognized that the imminent
threat of injury is sufficient to create an Article III case or controversy. 64
Because the defendant standing requirement is nearly always satisfied,
the issue does not arise in the typical case and is thus easily overlooked. It
becomes an issue only in the rare case involving a would-be defendant as to
whom the plaintiff has sought no relief. Typically, such would-be
defendants are intervenors who seek court permission to join the case as
parties to oppose the relief the plaintiff seeks. Not infrequently, then,
defendant standing becomes an issue in public law cases when the named
defendant (often a state or federal official) refuses to defend all or part of a
plaintiff’s claim, and a third party seeks to intervene as a defendant—for
example, to urge continued application of a purportedly unconstitutional
statute. 65
3. The Court Frequently Requires Defendants to Establish a Personal Stake
In those few cases in which the defendant’s standing seems questionable,
the Court has frequently based determinations of its own jurisdiction on
findings about whether the defendant’s personal stake was sufficient to
establish an Article III case or controversy. The Court has, for instance,
frequently premised a finding of jurisdiction (or the lack thereof) on facts
concerning the defendant’s stake in the litigation, hinting at a symmetrical
understanding of Article III standing—an interpretation of the Cases or
Controversies Clause as requiring both plaintiffs and defendants to possess
a sufficient personal stake in the outcome. In so doing, the Court has, in
effect, recognized that Article III standing requirements apply no less to
defendants than to plaintiffs, and has held that they apply both in the trial
court and on appeal.66 In short, “[s]tanding to sue or defend is an aspect of
the case-or-controversy requirement.” 67

63. Steinman, supra note 6, at 831. Indeed, the right to defend when faced with a
possible deprivation is a component of due process. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 271 (1970). This right to be heard in one’s own defense is necessarily a sufficient
personal stake to create an Article III case or controversy.
64. See, e.g., MedImmune, Inc., v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126–27 (2007)
(clarifying the compatibility of declaratory judgment actions with the Article III case or
controversy requirement); Nashville, Chattanooga, & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S.
249, 264 (1933) (holding that declaratory judgment proceeding was justiciable “so long as
the case retains the essentials of an adversary proceeding, involving a real, not a
hypothetical, controversy”).
65. See infra Part II.C (discussing examples).
66. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997); see also
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 618–21 (1989) (finding jurisdiction based on
defendant’s demonstrated personal stake); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986)
(denying standing to an intervenor-defendant, but holding that if the original defendant, the
State of Illinois, had appealed, “the ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ requirement would be met, for a
State has standing to defend the constitutionality of its statute”) (emphasis added).
67. Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 64 (emphasis added); see also Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95,
102–04 (1989) (recognizing defendants’ standing to appeal in state court declaratory

2012]

STANDING OF INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTS

1553

At the same time, the Court’s treatment of these issues has been
inconsistent, due in part to the lack of a clear theoretical framework. In
some cases, the Court has enforced something that looks like a defendantstanding requirement, but has done so using the rubrics of causation and
redressability—doctrines which are typically associated with plaintiff’s
standing. In other cases, the Court has skipped over these matters
altogether. The Court’s own confusion has left the lower courts with no
map to follow, thus generating predictably inconsistent results.
In a number of cases, the Court has dismissed the action for lack of
Article III jurisdiction because the defendant lacked a sufficient personal
stake. 68 In Diamond v. Charles, 69 for instance, the Court considered the
standing of an intervenor-defendant who sought to appeal the district
court’s determination that an Illinois law restricting abortion was
unconstitutional. 70 The appellant, Eugene Diamond, was a pediatrician in
private practice in Illinois, who had successfully intervened in the district
court to defend the law alongside the state-official defendants. 71 After the
district court invalidated the law, the state declined to appeal. Diamond
then sought to appeal alone. 72 The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction, stating that Diamond lacked the personal stake required
by Article III. 73
In reaching this decision, the Court first held that the state’s failure to
appeal ended the case or controversy between the original parties, and thus
required Diamond to establish standing in his own right to sustain federal
jurisdiction under Article III. 74 Next, the Court rejected Diamond’s various
efforts to establish a personal stake—as a doctor, a citizen, and a father—
noting that, on the facts of the case, none of Diamond’s proffered bases for
standing sufficed to create the requisite legally cognizable interest.75
Because no defendant with standing had sought review, the Court dismissed
the appeal on jurisdictional grounds.
In other cases, the Court has done the opposite, holding federal
jurisdiction proper based on its finding that the defendant’s stake in the
outcome was sufficient to create an Article III case or controversy. 76 In

judgment action); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953) (addressing the standing of
appellee to defend the judgment below).
68. See, e.g., Diamond, 476 U.S. at 69.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 56.
71. Id. at 57–58.
72. Id. at 61.
73. Id. at 69.
74. Id. at 68.
75. Id. at 68–70.
76. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 288–89 (2000) (finding
jurisdiction based on defendant-appellant’s personal stake in the case, despite mootness of
plaintiff’s claim); ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 618 (1989) (on appeal from state
supreme court, finding jurisdiction based on defendant-appellant’s personal stake in the case
although plaintiff lacked standing under federal standards).
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ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 77 for instance, individual state taxpayers, together
with an association of schoolteachers, challenged an Arizona statute
governing mineral leases as void under federal law. 78 The Arizona
Supreme Court found the statute invalid, and the Supreme Court affirmed.79
Before reaching the merits, the Court addressed the question of standing,
and acknowledged that, under federal standing rules, the plaintiffs would
have lacked standing to commence their action in federal court.80 The
Court held, however, that this was not fatal to its appellate jurisdiction.
Although the case did not present a “case or controversy” at the outset (on
account of the plaintiff’s lack of standing) it had been transformed into a
“case or controversy” by virtue of the state court judgment against the
defendant. Being subjected to such a judgment “constitutes the kind of
injury cognizable in this Court on review from the state courts.
[Defendants] are faced with ‘actual or threatened injury’ that is sufficiently
‘distinct and palpable’ to support their standing to invoke the authority of a
federal court.” 81 Thus, the defendant’s injury from the state court judgment
was sufficient to support a case or controversy. Although the plaintiff
lacked standing under federal justiciability law to complain initially about
the defendant’s conduct, the Court assessed its own appellate jurisdiction in
light of the injury imposed on the defendants by the state court
adjudication. 82
The Court offered two key rationales for its holding. First, it emphasized
that the functions served by justiciability doctrines—ensuring the
presentation of issues in a concrete factual setting, between adverse and
properly motivated parties—were met. 83 Second, the Court opined that,
because state courts are free to hear cases that do not meet federal
justiciability requirements, to hold that there was no case or controversy
would effectively render some state court adjudications of federal law
unreviewable—a result the Court found unacceptable.84 The Court might
have addressed this problem by simply vacating the state court judgment on
jurisdictional grounds. It was unwilling to do so, however, because that

77. 490 U.S. 605 (1989).
78. Id. at 610.
79. Id. at 610, 633.
80. Id. at 612–17. Justice Kennedy’s opinion stated that, even assuming that the
plaintiffs proved that the statute had cost the state millions of dollars that would otherwise
have been directed to schools, it was “pure speculation” whether a judgment in the plaintiffs’
favor would result in either lower taxes for the taxpayer plaintiffs or increased school
spending and compensation for the teacher’s association plaintiffs. Id. at 614. On this point,
Justice Kennedy’s opinion garnered four votes; the other four participating Justices saw no
reason to reach this issue. Id. at 609; id. at 633–34 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 618 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 500–01 (1975)).
82. Id. at 618–20. The Court also recognized the plaintiff’s right to defend on appeal the
judgment obtained below. Id.
83. Id. at 619.
84. Id. at 620–22.
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would effectively have imposed federal standing requirements on state
courts. 85
After ASARCO, the Court applied a similar rationale to find defendant
standing to appeal, despite the mootness of the plaintiff’s claim, where the
defendant’s own personal stake was deemed sufficient to create a case or
controversy. It is black letter law that a case or controversy must exist at all
stages of federal judicial review. 86 Thus, when a plaintiff’s claim becomes
moot while the case is pending on appeal, federal courts ordinarily dismiss
the action, and vacate the judgment below for lack of jurisdiction. 87 But
that option is not available for state court litigation of federal questions that
becomes moot pending appeal to the Supreme Court. Because state courts
are free to apply their own versions of mootness and standing doctrines, the
Supreme Court will not vacate a state court judgment in a case that was
justiciable under state law. 88 Again, the governing principle is that the
Supreme Court cannot foist federal jurisdictional rules onto state courts.
The key case is City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.89 There, the Court held that it
may exercise appellate jurisdiction in an otherwise moot lawsuit where the
plaintiff prevailed below, because the state court judgment creates an injury
to the defendant sufficient to create an Article III case or controversy. In
Pap’s A.M., the plaintiff, an operator of a nude dancing establishment, sued
Erie, Pennsylvania seeking an injunction barring the enforcement against
exotic dancers of an ordinance that banned public nudity. 90 The state trial
court granted the injunction on federal constitutional grounds, and the state
supreme court affirmed that decision. 91 While the City’s petition for
certiorari was pending, the seventy-two-year-old man who owned the
plaintiff corporation chose to retire. He thereafter submitted a sworn
declaration stating that he had exited the adult entertainment business and
retired permanently, had closed the dancing club that was the subject of the
litigation, and even sold the real estate on which it was located. He
therefore moved to dismiss the case as moot.92

85. Id. at 620–21.
86. See Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990) (holding that “the caseor-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial
and appellate”); see also FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 461 (2007) (arguing
that “[i]t is not enough that a dispute was very much alive when the suit was filed,” but case
or controversy requirements must exist at all stages of federal judicial review (quoting Lewis,
494 U.S. at 477)).
87. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950) (“The established
practice of the Court in dealing with a civil case . . . which has become moot . . . is to reverse
or vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss.”).
88. See, e.g., ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 620–21 (noting that the Court cannot properly vacate
a state court judgment on a question of federal law based on non-justiciability under federal
standards); Kan. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kan., 481 U.S. 1044 (1987)
(dismissing the case for lack of case or controversy, but leaving the state judgment intact).
89. 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
90. Id. at 284.
91. Id. at 284–86.
92. Id. at 287–89.
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The Court denied the motion, found the case not moot, and reversed on
the merits. The Court described the mootness issue as a “close” one, but
refused to dismiss on justiciability grounds because the City (the defendant
below) was suffering harm in the form of the state court’s order invalidating
its public nudity ordinance. 93 Thus, despite the apparent lack of a personal
stake on plaintiff’s part, the Court found defendant’s injury from the
judgment below sufficient in itself to establish federal jurisdiction.
Concurring in part, Justice Scalia referred to this part of the Court’s
rationale as “the neat trick of identifying a ‘case or controversy’ that has
only one interested party.” 94
Most recently, in McConnell v. FEC, 95 the Court again recognized the
critical role of defendant’s personal stake in establishing a case or
controversy. In McConnell, the plaintiff argued that the intervenordefendant’s appeal should be dismissed because the intervenor-defendant
lacked standing. The Court rejected this argument not on the theory that the
intervenor-defendants need not have standing, but instead because a
different defendant had standing sufficient to establish a federal case or
controversy. 96 In other words, the Court identified a case or controversy
sufficient to support federal jurisdiction based on its determination that the
named defendant, the Federal Election Commission, clearly had standing. 97
Then, having determined that there was a case or controversy based on the
personal stake of the original defendant, the Court permitted the intervenor
to piggyback on the existing dispute. 98
In all of these cases, the Court has held that the existence of a case or
controversy—and thus the propriety of federal jurisdiction—depends on
whether a defendant has a personal stake in the outcome. And yet, because
such cases are relatively rare, the lesson has been lost both on courts and on
most scholars.
B. The Persistent Misunderstanding of Defendant Standing
Notwithstanding the Court’s repeated application of Article III
limitations on standing to defend, lower courts have, for the most part, not
recognized defendant standing as a distinct component of Article III’s Cases
or Controversies Clause. 99 This subpart illustrates the plaintiff-centered
93. Id. at 288–89. The Court also suggested that despite plaintiff’s declaration, Pap’s
could conceivably resume its nude dancing operations at some point in the future. Id. at 288.
94. Id. at 307 (Scalia, J., concurring).
95. 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010).
96. Id. at 233.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. This may be partly explained by the rarity with which the issue comes up. As
discussed in Part II.A.2, supra, the issue will rarely come up with respect to named
defendants, unless the plaintiff simply names the wrong defendant. But when it does arise in
the trial court—most commonly with respect to intervenors—courts struggle due to the
absence of a clear and coherent doctrine.
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model of standing that prevails in lower federal courts, and demonstrates
that courts often conceal their consideration of defendant standing in the
guise of plaintiff standing.
When standing questions arise at the trial court level, courts focus their
analysis “almost invariably on the plaintiff.” 100 If the defendant enters into
the standing discussion at all, it is typically only in the context of the
“causation” and “redressability” of the plaintiff’s injury. 101 Thus, to the
extent they recognize the personal stake of the defendant as relevant to
Article III jurisdiction, courts typically have sought to force it into the
familiar categories of plaintiff standing, rather than recognizing defendant
standing as a distinct consideration. 102 Indeed, some courts have even gone
so far as to deny that Article III standing limitations apply to defendants at
all. 103 Only a very few lower court opinions have recognized the necessity
of a defendant’s stake in the outcome to the creation of an Article III case or
controversy. 104
Scholars of standing have done little to sort through this confusion. The
vast literature on Article III standing doctrine has focused almost uniformly
on plaintiff standing. 105 No scholar has mounted a sustained defense of the
proposition that Article III requires defendants, as much as plaintiffs, to
possess a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation. Indeed, when the
term “defendant standing” appears, it is typically used to refer to limits, not
Courts have been quicker to recognize that Article III may apply directly to the
defendant on appeal. The Supreme Court has held that where an intervenor seeks to appeal
an adverse judgment that the original defendant has not appealed, “[s]tanding to defend on
appeal in the place of an original defendant, no less than standing to sue, demands that the
litigant possess ‘a direct stake in the outcome.’” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,
520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997) (quoting Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986)).
100. 13A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 58, § 3531, at 4.
101. Id. at 5–6.
102. Id. § 3531.5, at 296; see also,e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
180 n.64 (1996) (noting that the lack of a proper defendant will lead to dismissal on plaintiff
standing grounds, based on lack of redressability); Hall v. LHACO, Inc. 140 F.3d 1190,
1193, 1196–97 (8th Cir. 1998) (denying standing based on a finding that the wrong party had
been sued).
103. See, e.g., Colo. ex rel. Simpson v. Highland Irrigation Co., 893 P.2d 122, 126–28
(Colo. 1995); see also 13A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 58, § 3531, at 5–6. This
Article is concerned primarily with civil litigation. The term “standing” may also be used in
the criminal context, where courts commonly consider the standing of a defendant to raise
certain arguments. See, e.g., Dowtin v. United States, 999 A.2d 903, 908 (D.C. 2010)
(holding that a defendant lacked “standing” to challenge an alleged violation of his codefendant’s Fifth Amendment rights). In that context, the question of standing is not
concerned with who may defend, but with the scope of arguments that the named defendant
may raise.
104. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., v. Jamison, 787 F. Supp. 231, 235 n.1
(D.D.C. 1990) (noting that Article III jurisdiction of federal courts may turn on “questions
related to whether the defendant has a sufficient interest to present a justiciable controversy
with the plaintiff”).
105. Hundreds of law review articles have addressed plaintiff standing; only one that I am
aware of has argued that a defendant’s personal stake is essential to the existence of a case or
controversy. See Steinman, supra note 6, at 831–34 (discussing the importance of the right to
defend and the nature of the personal stake that a party (plaintiff or defendant) must show to
establish standing to appeal).
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on who may defend, but only on the scope of arguments that a defendant
may raise. 106 Some scholars have simply recited the common judicial view
that the defendant’s personal stake goes only to the issue of the plaintiff’s
standing, by casting light on causation and redressability. 107
Quite apart from what the Cases or Controversies Clause may permit,
there are compelling policy reasons not to allow just anyone to defend a
litigation matter. 108 And federal courts have restricted defendant standing,
to a degree. But they frequently have done so by stretching aspects of the
plaintiff standing doctrine—namely, causation and redressability109—
beyond their intended application to do the work of ensuring that
defendants have the requisite personal stake in the controversy.
The Court has long held that federal courts lack jurisdiction over cases in
which, even though the plaintiff has shown an injury in fact, the named
defendant did not cause that injury, or the injury cannot be redressed by a
court order. 110 The earliest cases applying these doctrines used them to
reject plaintiff standing when the prospect of benefit accruing to the
plaintiff from the litigation was too speculative, because it depended on the
actions of unrelated third parties not before the court.111 In Warth v. Seldin,
for example, the Court dismissed an action against city officials brought by
plaintiffs who were seeking the construction of low income housing. 112 It
reasoned that causation and redressability were absent because no evidence
suggested the readiness of private developers to proceed even if the court
106. The Hart & Wechsler Federal Courts casebook, for instance, contains a thirteen-page
section addressing defendant standing that contains no discussion at all of any Article III
limits on who may defend a claim. Instead, the authors focus entirely on jus tertii,
overbreadth, and other doctrines limiting the scope of arguments that a particular defendant
may raise. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 153–65 (6th ed. 2009).
107. See, e.g., Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U.
L. REV. 159, 168, 179 (2011); Sunstein, supra note 11, at 193–95; Woolhandler & Nelson,
supra note 20, at 722–23 (“[T]he lack of a proper defendant . . . is normally thought of as a
standing issue, currently embodied in the requirements of causation and redressability.”).
108. The same policy reasons that the Court has relied on in denying standing based on
mere ideological interest apply with equal force to standing to defend. See, e.g., Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 (1992) (rejecting standing based on ideological
interest); see also Greening v. Moran, 953 F.2d 301, 305 (7th Cir. 1992) (“A litigant’s desire
to vindicate a position does not establish standing.”).
109. A plaintiff seeking to establish standing must show not only that she has suffered a
legally cognizable injury, but also that it was caused by the defendant’s actions, and that it
would be remedied by the relief requested. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 509 (1975).
110. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757–58 (1984) (denying standing to parents of
minority schoolchildren because the line of causation between tax incentives and
discriminatory private schools was “attenuated at best”); Warth, 422 U.S. at 509 (denying
standing where the “asserted injury” was “conjectural” and “the line of causation between
[the defendant’s] actions and [the] injury [wa]s not apparent from the complaint”).
111. Warth, 422 U.S. at 504 (denying standing where plaintiffs did not demonstrate that
there was a “substantial probability” that preventing defendants’ actions would achieve
plaintiff’s desired outcome); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617–18 (1973)
(denying standing where plaintiff did not show that enforcement of the jail sentence for
delinquent father would compel him to pay child support).
112. Warth, 422 U.S. at 493.
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enjoined unlawful discrimination by the named defendants. 113 In Warth,
the defendants plainly had a stake in resisting the requested injunction; the
denial of standing was based on uncertainty about whether unrelated third
parties who could not be bound by the Court’s order would change their
behavior if the Court enjoined the defendants’ alleged discrimination.
In other cases, however, federal courts have used the concepts of
causation and redressability to address doubts about the defendant’s
personal stake in the litigation.114 Courts have, for instance, denied
standing for lack of “causation” when plaintiffs challenging a law or policy
sued a public official who may have had no authority to enforce the
challenged statute.115 Cases in this category differ from the early causation
and redressability cases in that the plaintiff’s ability to obtain effective
relief does not depend on the actions of an unrelated third party subsequent
to the court’s judgment. Rather, the determination that standing is absent in
these cases turns primarily on the degree to which the defendant has a stake
in the outcome. Such loose application of plaintiff standing doctrine is all
too common, and it contributes to criticism of causation and redressability
as “arbitrary” and manipulable.116
In short, despite occasional indications by the Court that Article III
restricts defendant standing by imposing a requirement of personal stake on
defendants in federal litigation, courts and scholars have uniformly failed to
develop either a theory or a workable doctrine to guide decision making.
Courts have instead pushed causation and redressability beyond their
113. Id. at 504–07.
114. See 13A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 58, § 3531.6, at 393 (discussing
arbitrary lines drawn by redressability doctrine, and noting the “deeper conceptual problems”
that may “spring from the subtle opportunity to interchange the concepts of injury and
remedy”); id. § 3531.5, at 296 (noting the use of causation to dismiss cases of “plaintiffs
who simply had sued the wrong defendants”).
115. See id. § 3531.5, at 364 (“A common variety of the public-official defendant cases
involves actions brought by mistake or miscalculation against an official who lacks authority
to enforce a challenged statute . . . .”); see also, e.g., Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099,
1110 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he causation element of standing requires the named defendants
to possess authority to enforce the complained-of provision.”); ACLU v. Florida Bar, 999
F.2d 1486, 1490 (11th Cir. 1993) (“[W]hen a plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of a
rule of law, it is the state official designated to enforce that rule who is the proper
defendant . . . .”).
116. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 107, at 171 (describing standing as “one of the most
amorphous [concepts] in the entire domain of public law” (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 99 (1968)) (alteration in original)); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98
YALE L.J. 221, 229–34 (1988); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of
Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 301–05 (2002) (arguing that causation and
redressability requirements are merely “rhetorical barriers” that in practice do little to define
standing requirements); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV.
1741, 1775 (1999) (arguing that standing doctrine “is extraordinarily complicated and
malleable. In a high proportion of cases, a judge can write an opinion that either grants or
denies standing without departing from the norms that define the craft of judging”); Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 393, 480 (1996); Sunstein, supra note 11, at 195–97; Steven L. Winter,
The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371,
1420–21 (1988); see also 13A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 58, § 3531.3, at 124.
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intended parameters to deny standing to plaintiffs where the real issue is the
defendant’s lack of a personal stake in the outcome. In many cases, the
result—dismissal for failure to present an Article III case or controversy—
is the same as it would be if the courts explicitly based the decision on
defendant standing. But this solution works only haphazardly, and it
provides no framework for resolving questions of defendant standing in the
critical set of cases in which third parties seek to intervene as defendants.117
It would be theoretically more sensible, and more conducive to sound
decision making, to serve the goals of defendant standing directly, by
recognizing that Article III’s personal stake requirement applies to
defendants as well as plaintiffs. By fashioning the doctrine to fit more
closely the purposes it ostensibly promotes, courts could serve those
purposes better without exposing themselves to the criticisms that standing
doctrine frequently inspires.
C. Illustrating Intervenor-Defendant Standing
If courts have managed to enforce a requirement of defendant standing
using other doctrines, such as causation and redressability, one might ask
whether the confusion in the current doctrine has had any ill effects. The
answer is most clearly seen in a limited set of public law cases in which the
original defendant declines to defend a challenged law. In such cases, any
number of nonparties—legislators, citizens, or interest groups—may wish
to take up the mantle. Such participation may have significant policy
repercussions and frequently will raise profound separation of powers
concerns, giving added importance to the current doctrinal confusion.118
Two prominent cases now pending in the federal courts illustrate the
problems presented by such intervenors, and provide useful case studies for
exploring the application of Article III to defendants.
1. Intervenors and Standing to Defend
Although the vast majority of federal litigation concerns only the parties
named in the initial complaint, nonparties occasionally seek to intervene in
pending cases, arguing that their interests may be affected by the court’s
resolution of the matter. 119 Only rarely, however, will such parties be
required to establish standing in their own right. Courts have almost always
held that the case or controversy that exists between the original parties
satisfies Article III’s jurisdictional requirement, and that intervenors need
not independently establish Article III standing. 120 The rationale for this
117. See infra Part III.C.
118. See infra Part III.A.
119. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24.
120. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 233 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (“The National Right to Life plaintiffs argue that the
District Court’s grant of intervention to the intervenor-defendants . . . must be reversed
because the intervenor-defendants lack Article III standing. It is clear, however, that the
Federal Election Commission (FEC) has standing, and therefore we need not address the

2012]

STANDING OF INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTS

1561

rule is that, where the case or controversy required for federal jurisdiction is
present, the intervention of an additional party will not destroy the case or
controversy. 121
The exception to this general rule is that intervenors, whether aligned
with plaintiffs or defendants, must independently satisfy Article III standing
if they seek to litigate issues beyond those raised by the original parties,122
or if the case or controversy between the original parties ceases to exist, as
it did in Diamond v. Charles. 123 Thus, intervenors may piggyback on an

standing of the intervenor-defendants, whose position here is identical to the FEC’s.”); Ruiz
v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 830 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Article III does not require intervenors to
independently possess standing where the intervention is into a subsisting and continuing
Article III case or controversy and the ultimate relief sought by the intervenors is also being
sought by at least one subsisting party with standing to do so.”); Associated Builders &
Contractors v. Perry, 16 F.3d 688, 690 (6th Cir. 1994) (“An intervenor need not have the
same standing necessary to initiate a lawsuit in order to intervene in an existing district court
suit where the plaintiff has standing.”).
121. Prior to the Court’s decision in McConnell, there was a circuit split on the question
of whether intervenors were required to independently demonstrate Article III standing.
Most circuits had held that an intervenor was not required to show standing in the trial court,
but could simply “piggyback” on the case or controversy that existed between the plaintiff
and defendant. See, e.g., City of Colo. Springs v. Climax Molybdenum Co., 587 F.3d 1071,
1079 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that an intervenor “‘need not establish [independent] Article
III standing so long as another party with constitutional standing on the same side as the
intervenor remains in the case’” (alteration in original) (quoting San Juan Cnty. v. United
States, 503 F.3d 1163, 1172 (10th Cir. 2007))); Ruiz, 161 F.3d at 830 (same); Associated
Builders, 16 F.3d at 690 (same); Yniquez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1991)
(same); Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[A] party seeking to
intervene need not demonstrate that he has standing in addition to meeting the requirements
of Rule 24 as long as there exists a justiciable case and controversy between the parties
already in the lawsuit.”); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 190 (2d Cir. 1978)
(holding that the existence of a case or controversy between original parties negated the need
to impose standing requirements on the intervenor).
Before McConnell, three circuits had held that intervenors must show independent
Article III standing to participate in a case. See, e.g., Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300
(8th Cir. 1996); City of Cleveland v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 17 F.3d 1515, 1517 (D.C.
Cir. 1994); United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 1985). The
McConnell Court’s holding that, where a case or controversy exists between the original
parties, intervenors need not independently establish standing, however, calls these decisions
into question. Only one circuit has explicitly reaffirmed its rule after McConnell, and it did
so without citing McConnell. See ACLU of Minn. v. Tarek Ibn Ziyad Acad., 643 F.3d 1088,
1092 (8th Cir. 2011) (“‘In our circuit, a party seeking to intervene must establish Article III
standing in addition to the requirements of Rule 24.’” (quoting United States v. Metro. St.
Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d 829, 838 (8th Cir. 2009))).
122. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 233 (holding that intervenor-defendant need not establish
standing where original defendant had standing, and “[intervenor’s] position here is identical
to the [original defendant’s]”); Ruiz, 161 F.3d at 830 (rejecting argument that intervenors
must possess standing where “the ultimate relief sought by the intervenors is also being
sought by at least one subsisting party with standing to do so”).
123. See 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986) (“[A]n intervenor’s right to continue a suit in the absence
of the party on whose side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the
intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art. III.”); see also, e.g., Dillard v. Chilton
Cnty. Comm’n, 495 F.3d 1324, 1336 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Having determined that the
Intervenors cannot establish Article III standing of their own account, we turn now to the
alternative mechanism available to them for doing so: piggybacking upon the standing of
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existing case or controversy, and litigate without standing. But if they wish
to exceed the scope of the existing case or controversy—either
substantively, by raising issues not raised by the original parties124 or
temporally, by pressing onward after their aligned party has chosen not to
continue 125—they must independently establish standing under Article III.
The standing to defend of intervenor-defendants thus becomes a
determinative issue in a relatively small number of cases: primarily, those
in which the intervenor seeks appellate review of a trial court judgment not
appealed by the original defendant, or seeks to assert defenses not raised by
a party at the trial level. The next sections illustrate how these complexities
can arise, and show that, although rare, such cases may be highly
consequential.
2. Intervenor-Defendant Standing to Appeal: The Proposition 8 Litigation
The circumstances in which defendant standing may become dispositive
are illustrated by the pending federal litigation challenging California’s
Proposition 8. On November 4, 2008, California voters approved Ballot
Proposition 8, which amended the California constitution to provide that
“[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California.” 126
State court litigation commenced shortly thereafter,
followed by litigation in federal court alleging that Proposition 8 violated
the plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. 127 In the federal litigation, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the
plaintiffs prevailed in the district court, which issued an injunction
prohibiting enforcement of Proposition 8. 128
Perry featured an irregular roster of parties. Neither of the named
defendants (Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and Attorney General Jerry

the original parties. However, doing so requires the existence of an ongoing adversarial case
or controversy among existing parties . . . .”).
124. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 233 (holding that the standing of the intervenordefendant need not be addressed because its substantive position was identical to that of the
FEC, who plainly had standing); Ruiz, 161 F.3d at 830 (“Article III does not require
intervenors to independently possess standing where . . . the ultimate relief sought by the
intervenors is also being sought by at least one subsisting party with standing to do so.”).
125. Diamond, 476 U.S. at 68 (“[A]n intervenor’s right to continue a suit in the absence
of the party on whose side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the
intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art. III.”); Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d
45, 61 (1st Cir. 2003) (“It is clear that an intervenor, whether permissive or as of right, must
have Article III standing in order to continue litigating if the original parties do not do so.”).
126. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5. The final tally was 52.3 percent for, and 47.7 percent
against. Votes for and Against November 4, 2008 State Ballot Measures, CAL. SECRETARY
ST., http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/7_votes_for_against.pdf (last visited
Feb. 23, 2012).
127. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom.
Perry v. Brown, --- F.3d ----, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713 (9th Cir. Feb. 7,
2012); Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
128. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 995, 1004.
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Brown) was willing to defend Proposition 8’s constitutionality. 129 The
federal district judge permitted some of the original sponsors of the ballot
proposition, including five individuals and an organization called
ProtectMarriage.com, to intervene as defendants.130 The district court did
not require the intervenors to demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome
sufficient to create an Article III “case or controversy.” Instead, the court
reasoned that, because the named parties possessed such a personal stake,
Ninth Circuit precedent established that the trial court possessed jurisdiction
over the action, and had the discretion to permit the intervenors to
piggyback on the existing case or controversy. 131
Defendant’s standing took center stage only after entry of judgment,
when the intervenor-defendants sought to appeal. After the district court
entered judgment for plaintiffs, the government-official defendants took no
action, but the intervenor-defendants sought appellate review. 132 The
Proposition 8 case thus squarely presented a potentially dispositive issue of
defendant standing: namely, whether Article III permitted the sponsors of
Proposition 8 to appeal after the government officials responsible for that
law’s enforcement themselves declined to appeal the judgment below. The
Ninth Circuit determined that the appellants’ standing to appeal depended
on the nature of the interest, if any, given to official sponsors of an initiative
under California law, and it therefore certified that question of state law to
the California Supreme Court.133 The state court rendered its decision on
129. See Stephanie Condon, Prop. 8 Judges Chide Schwarzenegger, Brown for Not
Defending Law, CBS NEWS (Dec. 6, 2010, 5:22 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301503544_162-20024769-503544.html (stating that both liberal and conservative Ninth Circuit
judges disapproved of the executive’s failure to defend Proposition 8); Maura Dolan, Gov.
Won’t Defend Proposition 8, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 2009, at A4 (“California Atty. Gen. Jerry
Brown, going farther than Schwarzenegger, said in his legal response to the suit last week
that Proposition 8 violates the U.S. Constitution.”).
130. Order Granting Motion to Intervene at 3, Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (No. 09-2292),
available at https://ecf.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/09cv2292/files/76.pdf. For simplicity, I will
refer to the intervenor-defendants collectively as “ProtectMarriage.com” or “intervenordefendants.”
131. Id. (stating that intervention at the district court level is governed by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure Rule 24(a), and not the Article III “Case or Controversy” requirement). To
the extent that a piggybacking intervenor is barred from raising arguments not raised by its
aligned party, the correctness of the district court’s intervention decision in Perry is open to
question. See supra Part II.C.1.
132. The Administration’s Opposition to Defendant-Intervenors’ Motion for Stay Pending
Appeal at 3, Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (No. 09-2292), available at
https://ecf.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/09cv2292/files/717.pdf (implying that the Governor
would not appeal the district court’s ruling and arguing that allowing the court’s “judgment
to take effect serves the public interest”); Attorney General’s Opposition to DefendantIntervenors’ Motion for Stay Pending Appeal at 2, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d
921 (No. 09-2292), available at https://ecf.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/09cv2292/files/716.pdf
(stating that the Attorney General would no longer defend the case because “the public
interest weighs against [Proposition 8’s] continued enforcement”).
133. The question certified was:
Whether under Article II, Section 8 of the California Constitution, or otherwise
under California law, the official proponents of an initiative measure possess either
a particularized interest in the initiative’s validity or the authority to assert the
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the certified question in November 2011, holding that “when public
officials decline to defend a voter-approved initiative or assert the state’s
interest in the initiative’s validity, under California law the official
proponents of an initiative measure are authorized to assert the state’s
interest in the validity of the initiative and to appeal a judgment invalidating
the measure.” 134 On February 7, 2012, as this Article went to press, the
Ninth Circuit rendered its decision, finding that, as a matter of federal law,
the official sponsors of Proposition 8 possess standing to defend that
proposition, including standing to appeal the district court’s judgment. 135
3. Intervenor-Defendant Standing in the Trial Court:
The Defense of Marriage Act Litigation
Defendant standing may also be dispositive in a number of pending cases
concerning the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act. DOMA
became law on September 21, 1996, passing with veto-proof majorities in
both houses of Congress. 136 DOMA defines “marriage” for purposes of
interpreting any federal law as consisting only of “a legal union between
one man and one woman as husband and wife,” and defines “spouse” to
mean only “a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.” 137 In
addition, DOMA provides that states need not recognize marriages
performed in another state if they are not between one man and one
woman. 138
DOMA’s federal definition of “marriage” and “spouse” have been
challenged in numerous cases as violating the Fifth Amendment due
process rights of married same-sex couples. 139 Until recently, the federal
State's interest in the initiative's validity, which would enable them to defend the
constitutionality of the initiative upon its adoption or appeal a judgment
invalidating the initiative, when the public officials charged with that duty refuse
to do so.
Perry v. Brown, --- F.3d ----, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713, at *6 (9th Cir.
Feb. 7, 2012).
134. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1015 (Cal. 2011) (emphasis added).
135. Perry, --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL 372713, at *7–9 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012). The Ninth
Circuit’s thoughtful opinion is fully consistent with the approach to defendant standing
outlined in this Article. See infra Part IV.B.
136. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1
U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)). The bill garnered 85 votes in the Senate
and 342 in the House. 142 CONG. REC. 22,467; id. at 17,094 (1996).
137. 1 U.S.C. § 7.
138. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
139. See, e.g., In re Levenson, 587 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 2009); Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange,
447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006); Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1178
(N.D. Cal. 2011); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010);
Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr.
W.D. Wash. 2004). As of this writing, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, an arm of the
leadership of the House of Representatives, currently consisting of three Republicans and
two Democrats, has successfully sought to intervene in a number of cases challenging
section 3 of DOMA. For simplicity, this Article focuses on one of these pending cases,
Windsor v. United States, No. 10-civ-8435 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 9, 2010), although the
others raise similar issues.
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government defended the constitutionality of these definitional provisions.
On February 23, 2011, however, Attorney General Eric Holder announced a
change of policy in a letter to Speaker of the House John Boehner.140
Holder’s letter stated that in circuits that had held that classifications based
on sexual orientation were subject to rational basis review, the
Administration had defended section 3 of DOMA as meeting that standard.
But two recent cases, filed in the Second Circuit, where the standard of
review was an open question, had prompted the Administration to
“conclude[] that classifications based on sexual orientation warrant
heightened scrutiny,” and that “Section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional”
under that standard. 141 Accordingly, Holder stated, “the President has
instructed the Department not to defend the statute in Windsor and
Pedersen, now pending in the Southern District of New York and the
District of Connecticut.” 142 Finally, Holder stated his intention to notify
the courts in Windsor 143 and Pedersen 144 “of our interest in providing
Congress a full and fair opportunity to participate in the litigation in those
cases.” 145
On March 4, 2011, Speaker Boehner announced his intention to convene
the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG), a standing body of the
House of Representatives, 146 to consider how the House should proceed.
On April 18, 2011, he announced that BLAG would pursue the defense of
DOMA in place of the Department of Justice, and that BLAG had hired
former Solicitor General Paul Clement as lead counsel to defend DOMA.147
Clement promptly filed briefs in several pending cases, including Windsor
v. United States, a case pending in the Southern District of New York,
seeking permission for BLAG to intervene “for the limited purpose of

140. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen. of the United States, to John A.
Boehner, Speaker of the U.S. House of Reps. (Feb. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html [hereinafter Holder Letter].
141. Id. at 2, 5.
142. Id. at 5. Holder further stated that the Executive Branch would continue to enforce
DOMA section 3, until it was repealed by Congress or held unconstitutional by “the judicial
branch.” Id.
143. Windsor, No. 10-civ-8435.
144. Pedersen v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 3:10-cv-01750 (D. Conn. filed Nov. 9,
2010).
145. Holder Letter, supra note 140, at 6.
146. BLAG is composed of five members of the House leadership: the Speaker, the
Majority and Minority Leaders, and the Majority and Minority Whips. See Press Release,
Office of John Boehner, Statement by Congressman John Boehner (R-West Chester)
Regarding the Defense of Marriage Act (Mar. 4, 2011), available at
http://johnboehner.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=227399.
147. Letter from John Boehner, Speaker of the House of Representatives, to Nancy
Pelosi,
House
Minority
Leader
(Apr.
18,
2011),
available
at
http://johnboehner.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=237443; Michael
D. Shear, Law Firm Backs Out of Defending Marriage Act, N.Y. TIMES CAUCUS (Apr. 25,
2011, 12:28 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/25/law-firm-backs-out-ofdefending-marriage-act-partner-resigns/.
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defending the constitutionality of Section III” of DOMA. 148 The parties in
Windsor did not oppose the motion to intervene, and the court granted it.
Even had the trial court in Windsor denied the motion to intervene,
BLAG might, of course, have been permitted to participate as amicus
curiae. One might wonder, then, what significance party status has. First,
status as a party permits substantially more latitude to determine the course
of the litigation in the trial court. Parties may conduct discovery, file
motions, and examine witnesses, while amici are typically restricted to
filing briefs, and even then, only after application to the court.149 In
Windsor, for instance, BLAG participated actively in discovery150 and filed
a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint, prompting the Department of
Justice attorneys representing the named defendant to oppose that motion,
arguing that section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional. 151 Second, amici
have no appeal rights, while intervenor-defendants may, as discussed
above, be entitled to appeal even when their aligned parties elect not to.152
III. UNDERSTANDING DEFENDANT STANDING
Although there is powerful support in logic, constitutional text, and case
law for the notion that Article III requires parties on both sides to possess a
personal stake, the doctrine of defendant standing remains under-theorized.
Much has been written—by the Court and by scholars—about the nature of
the personal stake that plaintiffs must possess, but almost nothing has been
written about the personal stake that Article III requires of the defendant.
This part addresses that question and derives an approach to defendant
standing from the cases in which the Court has applied Article III
restrictions to defendants, and from the functions that standing doctrine is
designed to serve.
A. The Functions of Defendant Standing
The standing doctrine has been defended on both Article II and Article III
grounds. 153 The functions it serves include protecting the Executive
Branch against usurpation of its authority by Congress and the judiciary,154
148. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Unopposed Motion of the
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives to Intervene for a
Limited Purpose at 4, Windsor, No. 10-civ-8435 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2011), 2011 WL
3164126.
149. See SUP. CT. R. 37.
150. See Plaintiff’s Letter Brief in Support of Motion to Compel, at 1–2, Windsor, No.
10-civ-8435 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/
ltr_7_18_2011.pdf (noting that BLAG had insisted on party status, rather than amicus status,
and had participated in discovery).
151. See Defendant United States’ Memorandum of Law in Response to Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment and Intervenor’s Motion to Dismiss, at 4–28, Windsor, No.
10-civ-8435 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/819_doj_brief.pdf.
152. See supra Part II.C.1–2.
153. See supra Part I.A.
154. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992).
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and promoting sound judicial decision making. Standing serves the former
goal by limiting who may enforce the law, and the latter goal in part by
requiring that issues are presented to the courts in a concrete factual setting
by advocates with sufficient motivation to litigate effectively, 155 and by
prohibiting claims brought by concerned bystanders with exclusively
ideological aims, rather than individuals whose real-world interests are at
stake. 156 Each of these familiar functions counsels in favor of a model of
standing that limits not only who may bring a federal action, but also who
may defend one.
1. Defendant Standing and the Structure of the Federal Government
The same separation of powers concerns that underlie restrictions on
plaintiff standing 157 apply equally to the standing of defendants. Standing
is “founded in a concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of
the courts in a democratic society,” 158 so that the standing inquiry is
“especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force
[the Court] to decide whether an action taken by one of the other two
branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional.” 159 Standing
also preserves the Executive Branch’s control over the enforcement and
defense of federal laws. 160 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that to
permit private parties to vindicate the public interest in enforcement of a
law would threaten the separation of powers because it undermines “the
Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed.’” 161 Thus, the Court has looked askance at
claims of standing founded on nothing more than “vindication of the rule of
law.” 162 Separation of powers concerns make it difficult to establish
standing where a litigant’s “asserted injury arises from the government’s
allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else.”163
These concerns apply equally in circumstances in which an intervenor
seeks to defend a federal law that the President regards as unconstitutional.
The most salient feature of the category of cases that we are here concerned
with—public law cases featuring volunteer defendants—is that the
executive branch declined to defend the laws in question. A case in which
155. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (stating that the personal stake
requirement assures “that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions”).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
157. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (stating that standing is “built on a
single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers”).
158. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
159. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997).
160. See supra Part I.A.
161. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (quoting U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 3).
162. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 106 (1998).
163. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562.
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the President refuses to defend a federal law can readily be seen as an
instance of our divided government functioning as intended. The power to
pursue the government’s interest by defending (or not defending) a law is
an important component of the Executive’s authority. 164 The Chief
Executive’s decision not to defend a particular statute on the ground that it
is inconsistent with the higher law of the Constitution is a straightforward
exercise of his duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; faced
with contradictory laws, he must determine which one takes precedence.165
To allow a nonparty to assert defenses that the Executive has chosen not to
assert, or to appeal when the Executive declines to do so, necessarily shifts
that power from the Executive to the courts and Congress, by delegating to
the intervenor the Executive’s duty to “‘take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.’” 166 Permitting private citizens (or legislators) to
litigate in defense of a statute that the Executive has determined to be
unconstitutional thus “would enable the courts, with the permission of
Congress, to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of
another and co-equal department, and to become virtually continuing
monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.”167 The Court,
as Justice Scalia wrote in Lujan, has “always rejected that vision of [its]

164. See Scalia, supra note 58, at 897 (“Where no peculiar harm to particular individuals
or minorities is in question, lots of once-heralded programs ought to get lost or misdirected,
in [the federal bureaucracy] or elsewhere . . . [t]he ability to lose or misdirect laws can be
said to be one of the prime engines of social change.”).
165. I bracket for purposes of this discussion the larger question about when, if ever, a
President may legitimately decline to defend a duly enacted law. When such decisions are
based on policy grounds, they may be deeply problematic. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra
note 17, at 583–84 (stating that Article II’s “Take Care” clause “mak[es] . . . clear that the
President has no royal prerogative to suspend statutes”); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency
Action After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 670 (1985) (arguing that “the ‘take
Care’ clause does not authorize the executive to fail to enforce those laws of which it
disapproves”); see also Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245,
2347 (2001) (discussing the “risk that presidential administration might displace the
preferences of a prior . . . Congress by interpreting statutes inconsistently with their drafters’
objectives”).
For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that when the refusal to defend a law is
based on the President’s good faith opinion that a law is unconstitutional, the legitimacy of
the refusal to defend is likely at its greatest, in light of the President’s oath to “preserve,
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8; see
also Grove, supra note 20, at 798 n.56 (“Because the Constitution is the supreme law that
the Executive Branch is charged with faithfully executing, it should perhaps decline to
enforce seemingly unconstitutional provisions.”). But see Arthur S. Miller, The President
and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40 VAND. L. REV. 389, 397 (1987) (considering this
possibility, but concluding that the President should enforce the law even in this context).
166. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (quoting U.S. CONST. art II, § 3).
167. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Barnes v. Kline,
759 F.2d 21, 42 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting) (“By according congressmen standing
to sue the President, this court proposes a new and much different answer to the question of
the proper role of the federal courts in American constitutional disputation. Changing the
constitutional role of the federal courts, moreover, necessarily also alters that of Congress
and the President, and seems, on the rationale the majority advances, destined to alter that of
the States as well.”).
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role.” 168 The Court has adhered instead to “the Art. III notion that federal
courts may exercise power only ‘in the last resort, and as a necessity.’”169
In sum, the very same separation of powers policies that support limiting
plaintiff standing apply with equal force to defendant standing. 170 Indeed,
these separation of powers concerns are at their highest ebb where the
would-be defendant is Congress itself, as in the DOMA litigation, because
the concern about impinging on the President’s authority is magnified when
Congress also seeks to aggrandize its own power. 171
To be sure, these principles apply differently in the Proposition 8 and
DOMA cases. Federal separation of powers concerns do not apply in cases
challenging state laws, such as the Proposition 8 litigation.172 States may
have their own state law separation of powers reasons for denying standing
to intervenor-defendants (or intervenor-plaintiffs), 173 but if a state court
resolves those issues in favor of intervenor standing, then federalism
dictates a degree of deference to that conclusion by federal courts. 174 Thus,
the Article II theories of standing restrict intervenor standing only in cases
in which the intervenor seeks to enforce or defend federal law. An
168. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577.
169. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (quoting Chi. & Grand Trunk Ry. v.
Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892)).
170. One’s assessment of whether judicial intervention is appropriate in these
circumstances might, of course, differ depending on whether the would-be intervenor has a
plausible claim to the authority to represent the state’s interest. Thus, the Executive’s
prerogative to choose whether or not to defend a law may be merely a default rule, subject to
legislative revision. But this line of argument has been roundly rejected by the Court, which
has held, time and time again, that Congress cannot grant a right to sue to someone who does
not possess a concrete, personal, and particularized injury. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573.
“Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to
sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,
820 n.3 (1997). Although Raines and Lujan concern plaintiff standing, the analysis is the
same. If Congress can confer on an individual the Executive’s power to represent the state’s
interest in defending the law, there is no reason in principle why it cannot also confer the
state’s interest in enforcing the law.
171. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726–27 (1986) (finding that a statute that
vested sole authority in Congress to remove an Executive official violated separation of
powers because Congress may not aggrandize itself by exceeding the outer limits of its
power); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam) (finding that the separation
of powers doctrine contains “a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or
aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other”); see also Neil Kinkopf, Of
Devolution, Privatization, and Globalization:
Separation of Powers Limits on
Congressional Authority to Assign Federal Power to Non-federal Actors, 50 RUTGERS L.
REV. 331, 347 (1998) (noting that “the anti-aggrandizement principle applies only to how
power is allocated among the three branches of the federal government”); infra Part IV.A.
172. See Lynch, supra note 20, at 2028–29 (“[F]ederal separation of powers doctrine does
not apply in a rigorous fashion to arrangements between the branches of state
government . . . .”).
173. See Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1028 (Cal. 2011) (rejecting a separation of
powers challenge to intervenor defendant standing under the California state constitution).
174. See Perry v. Brown, --- F.3d ----, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713, at *8
(9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012) (holding that states may “decide for themselves who may assert their
interests and under what circumstances, and [may] bestow that authority accordingly”); see
also id. (“Principles of federalism require that federal courts respect such decisions by the
states as to who may speak for them . . . .”).
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intervenor who seeks to enforce or defend state law may do so without
raising federal separation of powers concerns.
2. Defendant Standing and Judicial Decision Making
The Article III justifications for standing doctrine—that it improves
judicial decision making, and limits the federal courts to their appropriate
constitutional role—are also served by applying Article III standing
limitations to defendants. Moreover, they apply with full force in both the
DOMA and Proposition 8 cases. Article III’s injury requirement is
ordinarily not satisfied by a litigant’s desire that a law be enforced against
someone else. In the plaintiff standing context, the Supreme Court has
distinguished between cases in which “the plaintiff is himself an object of
the action (or foregone action) at issue,” so that “there is ordinarily little
question” about standing, and cases in which the “plaintiff’s asserted injury
arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of
regulation) of someone else,” in which it is far more difficult for the
plaintiff to establish standing. 175 This principle would seem to apply no
less to defendants than to plaintiffs. Requiring that defendants possess a
personal stake facilitates better judicial decision making by ensuring that all
parties are strongly motivated and thus guarantees vigorous advocacy on
both sides. Moreover, the application of a personal stake requirement to
both plaintiffs and defendants ensures that there is a close relationship
between the plaintiff’s legal claim and requested remedy, on the one hand,
and the defendant, on the other. This close connection helps ensure that
legal issues are presented to the court in a concrete factual setting that will
facilitate analysis and decision making.
Similarly, recognizing that defendants must have a personal stake
conserves judicial resources by limiting the arguments that may be raised
by an intervenor-defendant, and by facilitating the dismissal of cases in
which the intervenor-defendant is the only defendant who wishes to litigate
at all. In most cases, as noted above, defendant standing is plainly present,
and is not litigated. The few cases in which requiring defendant standing
would affect the outcome are those in which the defendant intervenors lack
a concrete and particularized injury. In those cases, the conventional view
of standing as focused on the plaintiff may not permit dismissal of the case,
because the plaintiff possesses an adequate personal stake. In contrast,
recognizing that Article III’s personal stake requirement extends to
defendants would permit dismissal, thereby conserving judicial resources.
In sum, bringing defendant standing out into the open would facilitate
better decision making by simplifying the doctrine and pushing courts to
give explicit consideration to the separation of powers and other policies
that the doctrine means to serve. Moreover, in the context of challenges to
federal law, it would protect the Executive Branch against usurpation of its
power by the other branches.
175. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561–62 (1992).
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B. Assessing the Defendant’s Personal Stake
If a necessary condition for an Article III case or controversy is that both
parties possess an adequate personal stake in the action, the question
becomes: what sort of showing will suffice to establish a defendant’s
personal stake? I argue that a fairly straightforward rubric for assessing
defendant standing can be derived from the various decisions in which the
Court has had occasion to assess the Article III standing of defendants, and
from the purposes that standing doctrine is intended to serve. In particular,
I argue, a defendant may establish standing to defend in three ways. First, a
defendant against whom a claim is asserted can establish standing to defend
simply by showing that the plaintiff seeks relief against her. A defendant as
to whom no claim is asserted—typically an intervenor-defendant—can
establish standing to defend either by showing a reasonable apprehension of
injury from judicial resolution of the plaintiff’s claim, or by establishing a
right, conferred by state or federal law, to defend against the plaintiff’s
claim.
1. Defendants as to Whom a Remedy Is Sought
With respect to the first category, when a remedy—most often damages
or an in personam injunction—is actually sought against the defendant, the
standing of that particular defendant is easily established. 176 The Court has
so held, and properly so, inasmuch as the defendant from whom the
plaintiff seeks relief has a due process right to oppose the requested
relief, 177 and thus a sufficient personal stake to do so.
Courts are already familiar with this approach to assessing a party’s
personal stake in the closely related setting of determining standing to
initiate a declaratory judgment action. In terms of Article III standing,
declaratory judgment plaintiffs are similarly situated to defendants in other
actions: both are faced with a legal claim or the threat thereof. And in both
contexts, the Court has assessed standing in terms of the threat of injury.178
If, as the Court has held, the mere threat of litigation seeking relief against a
party is sufficient to establish the personal stake required by Article III, then
a fortiori, the actual commencement of litigation seeking concrete relief
176. See supra Part II.A.2.
177. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
178. The standing of a declaratory judgment plaintiff turns on whether she reasonably
anticipates practical and/or legal consequences from the assertion of the threatened claim.
See Nashville, Chattanooga, & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933) (holding
that a declaratory judgment proceeding was justiciable “so long as the case retains the
essentials of an adversary proceeding, involving a real, not a hypothetical, controversy”); see
also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937) (holding that the Declaratory
Judgment Act was constitutional, and permitting declaratory judgment in “a concrete case
admitting of an immediate and definitive determination of the legal rights of the parties in an
adversary proceeding . . . although the adjudication of the rights of the litigants may not
require the award of process or the payment of damages”). Similarly, as discussed above,
the standing of a defendant is established by the risk of injury should the court grant relief on
plaintiff’s claim. See supra Part III.B.
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against a defendant must give that defendant a sufficient personal stake to
satisfy the Cases or Controversies Clause. 179 In light of the similarities
between defendants and declaratory relief plaintiffs, it is perplexing that
courts have treated them differently for standing purposes, by focusing on
the personal stake of a declaratory relief plaintiff, but not consistently
taking the same approach in assessing the personal stake of a defendant.
This path to establishing defendant standing applies as well to cases at
the appeal stage as to those at the trial stage. When a defendant seeks to
attack the judgment below, the general test for standing to appeal is whether
the appellant is “aggrieved” by the judgment. 180 A party is aggrieved by
the judgment below if it imposes a cognizable injury on that party—by, for
instance, requiring the party to pay money or abide by the terms of an
injunction. 181 Thus, a defendant may establish the requisite injury for
purposes of an appeal simply by showing that he or she is subject to an
allegedly incorrect lower court judgment. 182 Indeed, a defendant-appellant
aggrieved by the judgment below has standing even more clearly than a
defendant at the trial level, because she is actually affected by a judgment,
rather than merely threatened by one.
2. Defendants as to Whom No Remedy Is Sought
With respect to defendants against whom no remedy is sought, typically
intervenor-defendants, the picture is more complicated. An intervenordefendant against whom no claim is asserted may seek to establish standing
179. Some courts have explicitly recognized the close relationship between the standing
required of a declaratory relief plaintiff and the personal stake of a defendant. See, e.g.,
Collin Cnty., Tex. v. Homeowners Ass’n for Values Essential to Neighborhoods (HAVEN),
915 F.2d 167, 172 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that the county’s declaratory relief action against
homeowners’ association was non-justiciable where county could not have been made a
defendant had homeowners’ association sued); Peick v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 724
F.2d 1247, 1258 n.10, 1260 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that defendant was the proper
defendant, in part based on determination that defendant would have had standing to initiate
declaratory relief action).
180. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 623–24 (1989) (finding standing to appeal
for defendant-appellant based on injury from judgment below); Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v.
Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980); see also Steinman, supra note 6, at 840.
181. Roper, 445 U.S. at 333 (“A party who receives all that he has sought generally is not
aggrieved by the judgment affording the relief and cannot appeal from it.”); Rinehart v. Saint
Luke’s S. Hosp., No. 10-2209, 2011 WL 3348234, at *8 (D. Kan. Aug. 3, 2011) (“‘A party
is aggrieved whose legal right is invaded by an act complained of or whose pecuniary
interest is directly affected by the order.’” (quoting Fairfax Drainage Dist. v. City of Kan.
City, 374 P.2d 35 (1962))); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 77 (9th ed. 2009) (defining
aggrieved as “having been harmed by an infringement of legal rights”).
182. Indeed, the injury inflicted by an allegedly erroneous judgment may be sufficient to
anchor federal jurisdiction even where the plaintiff’s stake in the outcome did not meet
federal justiciability standards. When a plaintiff has secured a judgment, a defendant injured
by that judgment will be permitted to appeal, even if the plaintiff has no personal stake in the
outcome under federal law. The Court has so held, both in cases where the plaintiff lacked
standing from the outset of the litigation, see ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 618, 623, and in cases
where the plaintiff’s claim became arguably moot after entry of judgment, see City of Erie v.
Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 288–89 (2000).
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by showing a reasonable apprehension of injury from judicial resolution of
the plaintiff’s claim. In such cases, the showing required for a plaintiff
seeking to demonstrate standing again provides an illuminating point of
comparison. The linchpin of Article III standing as applied to plaintiffs is
that the plaintiff must show that she or he has personally suffered an injury
as a result of the defendant’s conduct, 183 or that the relevant legislature has
validly conferred standing on the plaintiff. 184 In the context of declaratory
relief, the injury requirement is satisfied by the plaintiff’s reasonable
apprehension of being sued by the defendant. 185 Of course, Congress
cannot create standing where no injury exists. Thus, valid legislative
conferrals of standing will commonly involve either the creation of a right
or the delegation to the plaintiff of the authority to represent the state or
federal government’s own interest. 186
The appropriate test for assessing the standing of intervenor-defendants
follows from these examples. The personal stake of intervenor-defendants
may be assessed by looking to whether there is a reasonable risk that the
judicial resolution of the plaintiff’s claim will injure some legally
protectable interest of the defendant. This standard may be satisfied where
the court’s resolution of the plaintiff’s claims may adversely affect the
intervenor-defendant, even absent a grant of relief against the defendant
directly. For instance, property owners may seek to intervene as defendants
in litigation under environmental laws in which the court’s resolution of the
plaintiff’s claim could indirectly limit development of their land.187
Similarly, in legislative standing cases, legislators may seek to intervene to
prevent an “institutional injury,” even where there is no request for a
remedy against the legislator or the legislature. In such cases, defendant
standing is satisfied by the intervenor-defendant’s reasonable expectation of
harm resulting from judicial resolution of the plaintiff’s claims.
Conversely, where the intervenor-defendant will not be adversely affected
by a court order resolving the plaintiff’s claims, as in Diamond v. Charles,
standing to defend has been denied. 188

183. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (citations omitted); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751
(1984).
184. See, e.g., Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765,
773 (2000) (holding that qui tam relators have standing under Article III because the False
Claims Act constituted “a partial assignment of the Government's damages claim”); Karcher
v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 75, 80 (1987) (noting that state legislators were invested by state law
with the authority to assert the state’s interest in the constitutionality of a law).
185. See Nashville, Chattanooga, & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933);
see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937).
186. See supra Part I.C; see also, e.g., Vt. Agency of Natural Res., 529 U.S. at 771–78;
Karcher, 484 U.S. at 75–78, 80.
187. See, e.g., Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Babbitt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1285 (E.D. Cal.
2000) (permitting property owners to intervene as defendants in an Endangered Species Act
case brought by environmental group challenging the Secretary of Interior’s failure to protect
a habitat).
188. See supra Part II.A.3.
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Finally, defendants may establish the requisite personal stake by showing
that the law confers on them a right to defend against the plaintiff’s claim.
Although such laws are relatively rare, the Court has explicitly recognized
that they confer a sufficient personal stake to create a case or controversy.
In Karcher v. May, 189 for instance, the Court pointed to a specialized
provision of New Jersey state law in finding that defendants initially
possessed standing to defend, and that they later lost it when they were
removed from their positions of legislative leadership. 190 In contrast, the
Court in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona expressed skepticism
about the intervenor-defendants’ standing to defend a law where no state
law appeared to confer any such right on the intervenors. 191
C. Rule 24 and Defendant Standing
One might ask whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24’s
requirements for intervention obviate the need to recognize that the Article
III standing requirement applies to defendants as well as plaintiffs. To be
sure, there is some affinity between the two doctrines. Rule 24(a)’s
requirement of “an interest relating to the property or transaction”192
precludes intervention of right by many prospective intervenors who also
would be unable to satisfy a requirement of defendant standing. But
although the requirements overlap, they are not identical. Rule 24 permits
intervention in some cases in which the model of defendant standing
articulated above would not be satisfied, and it permits courts to deny
intervention even where the intervenor-defendant does possess standing. 193
First, Rule 24(a)’s interest requirement is not perfectly contiguous with
that of Article III’s Cases or Controversies Clause. The Rule requires “an
interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the
action,” which the federal courts have not construed to be quite as rigorous
as Article III’s standing requirements. 194 The Supreme Court has held that
intervenors need not independently satisfy Article III standing requirements
so long as they do not exceed the scope of the underlying case or
controversy. 195 Most circuits have recognized that intervenors may satisfy
189. 84 U.S. 72 (1987).
190. See infra Part IV.A.1.
191. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997).
192. Rule 24(a) permits intervention as a matter of right to anyone who
is given an unconditional right to intervene by federal statute[,] or claims an
interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and
is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or
impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties
adequately represent that interest.
FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a) (permitting intervention of right “on timely motion”).
193. The Rule permits the court to deny intervention, notwithstanding the prospective
intervenor’s interest in the outcome, where “existing parties adequately represent that
interest.” FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
194. See supra Part II.C.1.
195. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 233 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (declining to address standing of the intervenor-
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Rule 24(a) without demonstrating an interest sufficient to establish Article
III standing. 196 And even those circuits that have required intervenors to
demonstrate Article III standing have recognized that Article III imposes a
different and higher standard than Rule 24(a). 197 Moreover, Rule 24(b),
unlike Rule 24(a), imposes no requirement that the intervenor possess an
interest at all; it authorizes intervention by anyone who “has a claim or
defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or
fact.” 198
The DOMA litigation nicely illustrates the substantial space between the
requirements of Rule 24 and those of Article III standing. Lower courts in
numerous circuits have granted BLAG’s motions to intervene on the vague
ground that federal legislators have an “interest” in the validity of federal
laws, without even considering the high bar imposed by federal legislative
standing doctrine. 199 This highlights an important formal difference
between Rule 24 and Article III standing: Article III standing is a
jurisdictional rule that mandates dismissal where standing is lacking. It
thus serves to ensure that courts do not act in excess of their jurisdiction.
Rule 24 is not regarded as limiting courts’ jurisdiction, and it serves a
different set of goals. The Rule’s leniency allows district court judges to
balance the Federal Rules’ aims of efficiency, accuracy, and fairness by
permitting a litigant who may possess special insight or incentive, or whose
interests may not be fully protected by the existing parties, to intervene.200
This is all to the good when the court’s jurisdiction is established by an
existing case or controversy, but Rule 24 cannot serve to keep courts within
Article III’s bounds. For that purpose, a clearer understanding of Article
III’s application to defendants is required.
IV. APPLYING DEFENDANT STANDING
This part applies the model of standing to defend developed in Part III to
the DOMA and Proposition 8 litigation, and argues that BLAG’s standing

defendant where the named defendant had standing and the intervenor-defendant took a
position identical to the named defendant).
196. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 830 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Article III does not
require intervenors to independently possess standing . . . .”); Associated Builders &
Contractors v. Perry, 16 F.3d 688, 690 (6th Cir. 1994) (“An intervenor need not have the
same standing necessary to initiate a lawsuit . . . .”). See generally supra Part II.C.1.
197. See, e.g., ACLU of Minn. v. Tarek Ibn Ziyad Acad., 643 F.3d 1088, 1092 (8th Cir.
2011) (“‘In our circuit, a party seeking to intervene must establish Article III standing in
addition to the requirements of Rule 24.’” (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Metro.
St. Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d 829, 838 (8th Cir. 2009))).
198. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b) (permitting intervention, on “timely motion” and with the
court’s permission, to anyone who satisfies the requirement quoted in text, or who “is given
a conditional right to intervene by a federal statute”).
199. See, e.g., Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (N.D. Cal.
2011); Windsor v. United States, No. 10-civ-8435 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 9, 2010); Gill v.
Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010).
200. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating that the Rules “should be construed and administered to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”).
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to defend DOMA in the various cases in which it has intervened turns on
whether BLAG can establish its personal stake under the Court’s legislative
standing case law. Similarly, the standing to defend of the intervenors in
the Proposition 8 litigation depends on whether California state law confers
the state’s interest in defending a law enacted by ballot proposition on the
official proponents of that ballot initiative. I conclude that intervenor
standing to defend is proper in the Proposition 8 case, but not in the DOMA
litigation.
A. Intervenor-Defendant Standing in the Trial Court:
The Defense of Marriage Act
In the Windsor case, BLAG was permitted to intervene to defend the
constitutionality of section 3 of DOMA. An assessment of the ability of
congressional committees or representatives to intervene in DOMA
litigation must take account not only of the doctrine of defendant standing,
but also of the peculiarities of legislative standing. This section describes
the Court’s rule for legislators wishing to intervene to defend a law that the
executive will not defend, and applies it to the efforts of the House of
Representatives to intervene in DOMA litigation. The question of the
intervenors’ standing to defend in Windsor is twofold: (1) do the
intervenors possess a sufficient personal stake in their own right, and (2) if
not, has Congress validly conferred on them the authority to represent the
federal government’s interest?
1. Legislative Standing to Defend
Under the Court’s legislative standing case law, legislators wishing to
intervene in federal court actions must establish either a personal injury or
an injury to the power of Congress to craft legislation.201 Like the plaintiffs
in Raines, the intervenors do not contend that they have been “singled out
for specially unfavorable treatment” compared to other members of
Congress. 202 Rather, their claim can only be that their votes for DOMA
have been “completely nullified” by the President’s actions.203 But the
Court in Raines took a very restrictive view of legislative standing, holding,
in pertinent part, that it exists only when a legislative act does not go into
effect despite the legislator having cast a vote that was “sufficient
to . . . enact” the Act.204
That standard is plainly not met here. First, DOMA did go into effect,
and it remains the law. Indeed, the President stated that he would continue
to enforce section 3 of DOMA until it was overturned. 205 Second, unlike
the challenged action in Raines, the President’s refusal to defend section 3
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

See supra Part I.B.
See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821 (1997).
Id. at 823.
Id.
See supra Part II.C.
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does not single-handedly dictate the result. The law may or may not be
overturned; the court could appoint the intervenors or others as amici to
ensure that it hears vigorous arguments on all sides. Moreover, the federal
courts have frequently upheld laws despite the President’s refusal to
defend. 206 Ultimately, under the restrictive standard of Coleman and
Raines, the President’s mere refusal to defend the constitutionality of the
law inflicts no injury on the intervenors, and cannot amount to “complete
nullification” of their votes.
2. Congressional Conferral of Standing to Defend
The Supreme Court has addressed the standing of legislators to intervene
as defendants in only one case, Karcher v. May. 207 Interestingly, just as in
the DOMA and Proposition 8 contexts, state executive officials in Karcher
had refused to defend a law challenged on federal constitutional grounds.208
As a result, leaders of the New Jersey state legislature intervened in federal
litigation to defend the statute.209 The Supreme Court held that the
legislator-intervenors had Article III standing to defend the law in the trial
court, based on its determination that legislative leaders “had authority
under state law to represent the State’s interests” by defending a state
statute that “neither the Attorney General nor the named defendants would
defend.” 210 Thus, standing at the trial court level had been proper.211
The Court, however, went on to find that the legislator-intervenors lacked
standing, based on changes in their status that occurred after trial. While
the case was pending, the intervenors lost their leadership positions, and
their successors moved to withdraw their appearance.212 The Court rejected
the intervenors’ request to proceed in their individual capacities, holding
that the intervenors no longer had standing to defend the law in the
Supreme Court. 213 This determination rested on state law, which, the Court
held, granted standing to the legislative leaders in their official capacity.
Thus, once the intervenors had lost their leadership positions, the state law
right on which their standing was based no longer was theirs to assert. 214
Karcher thus holds that Article III restricts who may defend a law, both
at trial and on appeal, and that standing to defend a state law rests with

206. See Nina Totenberg, U.S. Sends Conflicting Signals on Gay Marriage Law, NPR
(Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/03/01/134132526/u-s-defends-doma-despitedropping-support (enumerating instances when U.S. Presidents have refused to defend laws
in court, noting that some such laws were subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court).
207. 484 U.S. 72 (1987).
208. Id. at 82; see also id. at 75.
209. Id. at 82.
210. Id. at 75, 82.
211. Id. at 80.
212. Id. at 76.
213. Id. at 77 (“The authority to pursue the lawsuit on behalf of the legislature belongs to
those who succeeded Karcher and Orechio [the intervenor-defendants] in office.”).
214. Id.
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those officials endowed by state law with the authority to represent the
state’s interest. 215
In contrast with the state law at issue in Karcher, Congress has not, as of
this writing, passed a law or adopted a resolution authorizing the leadership
of the House of Representatives to represent the federal government’s
interests in court by defending DOMA, or federal law in general. Quite the
contrary: federal law vests the authority to represent the interests of the
United States exclusively in the Attorney General, subject only to specified
exceptions. 216 Existing law does require the Attorney General to notify the
General Counsel of the House of Representatives if he determines that he
intends to refrain “from defending or asserting, in any judicial,
administrative, or other proceeding, the constitutionality of any provision of
any Federal statute.” 217 Nothing in the statute, however, purports to
authorize the General Counsel to intervene in event of such notice, or
confers on the House the authority to represent the interest of the United
States in defending any law.
Moreover, even if there were statutory authorization of the sort relied on
by the Court in Karcher v. May, it is far from clear that such a law would
satisfy Article III in circumstances involving intervention by federal
legislators. In Karcher, the Court deferred to the state of New Jersey’s
judgments about the appropriate distribution of governmental authority
between its executive and legislative branches. In the context of DOMA,
however, the Court will be constrained by the U.S. Constitution’s scheme
of separation of powers, and by the risk to the Court’s credibility if it were
perceived to be taking sides in a dispute between the other two branches.218
As the Court noted when it denied legislative standing in Raines, “It is
settled that Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by
statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise
have standing.” 219
In sum, because the intervenor-defendants in Windsor seek to raise
defenses not raised by the original defendant, they should have been
required to establish Article III standing. And under the stringent test for
215. Id. at 82 (noting that the legislators were permitted to intervene because state law
endowed them with authority to defend state laws if the Executive would not).
216. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006) (providing that “the conduct of litigation” involving the
United States is reserved to the Attorney General, “[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by
law”). The “otherwise authorized by law” exception to § 516 has been read to require a
statutory enactment, and not a mere resolution of a single house. See Senate Select Comm.
on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 56 n.8 (D.D.C. 1973)
(“[A]ny exception to § 516 must be one ‘authorized by law.’ Although the question has
never been specifically litigated, it seems apparent that ‘law’ in § 516 would not include a
legislative action of the sort represented by S.Res. 262. The term ‘law’ does not normally
encompass within its definition ‘resolution,’ and all recognized exceptions to § 516, such as
10 U.S.C. § 1037, are statute laws enacted by both Houses.”). Thus, the House proceedings
by which BLAG was authorized to intervene in the various DOMA cases cannot suffice.
217. 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1)(B)(ii); see also 2 U.S.C. § 130f(b) (2006).
218. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 833 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
219. Id. at 820 n.3 (majority opinion).
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legislative standing established in Raines and Coleman, it seems unlikely
that the Court would find that the intervenor-defendants have standing.
Because standing to defend is required in the trial court as well as on
appeal, their motion to intervene should have been denied for lack of
standing to defend.
B. Intervenor-Defendant Standing to Appeal: Proposition 8
In
Perry
v.
Schwarzenegger,
the
initiative
proponent,
ProtectMarriage.com, was permitted to intervene as defendant in the trial
court without being required to establish standing in its own right. 220 But
because ProtectMarriage.com sought to appeal alone after losing in the trial
court, the Ninth Circuit raised the question of the defendant’s standing to
appeal. 221
ProtectMarriage.com offered three separate theories in its effort to
establish standing. The first involved an injury in fact to the organization
itself, based on its financial and other expenditures in drafting and
supporting Proposition 8. The second was an associational standing theory,
alleging that the organization had standing to vindicate the rights of its
individual members. The third was akin to a legislative standing theory,
and was premised on the claim that state law confers the state of
California’s interest in defending a law enacted by ballot initiative on the
sponsors of the initiative in question, at least where state executive branch
officials refuse to defend the law.
1. Organizational Standing to Defend
An organization can demonstrate the personal stake required by Article
III in one of two ways: First, it can sue on its own behalf if it can satisfy
the same standing test that applies to individuals. 222 Second, it can sue in a
representative capacity, asserting the rights of its individual members, under

220. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2010); aff’d sub
nom. Perry v. Brown, --- F.3d ----, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713 (9th Cir.
Feb. 7, 2012).
221. Perry, --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL 372713, at *2; see also Arizonans for Official English
v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997) (holding that “[a]n intervenor cannot step into the shoes
of the original party unless the intervenor independently ‘fulfills the requirements of Article
III’” (quoting Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986))).
222. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378–79 (1982) (“In determining
whether HOME has standing under the Fair Housing Act, we conduct the same inquiry as in
the case of an individual . . . .”); see also Abigail Alliance for Better Access v. Von
Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 129, 132 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“‘There is no question that an association
may have standing in its own right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to vindicate
whatever rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy.’” (quoting Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975))); ACORN v. Fowler, 178 F.3d 350, 356 (5th Cir. 1999) (“An
organization has standing to sue on its own behalf if it meets the same standing test that
applies to individuals.”).
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what is called “associational standing.” 223 ProtectMarriage.com alleged
both theories.
As to the first, ProtectMarriage.com attempted to establish standing in its
own right, alleging that its expenditure of money and time in drafting and
supporting Proposition 8 gives rise to the risk of an injury in fact sufficient
to permit its defense of the law. 224 This argument, however, is difficult to
reconcile with the prohibition on standing based on generalized grievances.
In the plaintiff standing context, the Supreme Court has long held that
“generalized grievances,” such as the broad desire to have the government
enforce the law, do not suffice to confer standing on individuals. 225 The
Court has repeatedly held that the appropriate means of redress for injuries
that are widely shared is through the political branches and not the courts,
because the courts’ antidemocratic action is legitimate only when necessary
to protect constitutional rights of a minority. 226 When the political
branches fail to serve the wishes of the majority, the appropriate remedy is
at the ballot box, not in the courts. 227 As the Court held in Diamond v.
Charles, an ideological desire to defend a statute on the part of a member of
the general public does not establish an Article III personal stake.228
If ever there was a widely shared grievance, it was the grievance held by
the majority of California voters who supported Proposition 8 at the ballot
box against their elected Governor and Attorney General, who refused to
defend Proposition 8 in court. Not only did millions of California voters—
52.3 percent of those who cast ballots—support Proposition 8, tens of
thousands of them gave money or time in support of its passage.229 Indeed,
223. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (recognizing the right of
an organization to represent injured members); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 459 (1958) (recognizing the NAACP’s standing to represent its members and
challenge a state law forcing it to disclose membership lists); see also Hunt v. Wash. State
Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) (referring to the doctrine as
“associational standing”).
224. See Brief for Defendant-Intervenors-Appellants at 22, Perry, --- F.3d ----, Nos. 1016696, 11-16577, available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2010/09/22/
10-16696_openingbrief.pdf; see also Brief for Appellees at 33, Perry, --- F.3d ----, Nos. 1016696, 11-16577, available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2010/10/27/
Answering_Brief2.pdf.
225. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1992).
226. See id. at 576 (“Vindicating the public interest (including the public interest in
Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the
Chief Executive.”).
227. See id. at 576–77; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499–500 (1975); see also Scalia,
supra note 58, at 881.
228. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65 (1986) (“Because the State alone is entitled to
create a legal code, only the State has the kind of ‘direct stake’ identified in Sierra Club v.
Morton . . . in defending the standards embodied in that code.”).
229. The dollar value of 2008 contributions to “Yes on 8” through the National
Organization for Marriage and ProtectMarriage.com totaled nearly $42,000,000, while the
total number of donations was at least 46,941. See Campaign Finance: Proposition 008 –
Eliminates Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry. Initiative Constitutional Amendment, CAL.
SECRETARY ST., http://cal-access.sos.ca.gov/Campaign/Measures/Detail.aspx?id=1302602&
session=2007 (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).
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many individuals donated five and six-figure sums to support Proposition
Thus, the stake alleged by ProtectMarriage.com is not
8. 230
“particularized” in the way that Article III requires.231 Rather, it might
fairly be characterized as “only a generally available grievance about
government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in
proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no
more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large.”232
The Court has “consistently held” that such an alleged injury “does not state
an Article III case or controversy.” 233
Moreover, recognizing organizational standing for ProtectMarriage.com
raises a related problem of judicial administration. If financial and other
investments in support of a ballot proposition were sufficient to confer
standing to defend the resulting law, then not only ProtectMarriage.com,
but many others, including countless individuals, would have standing to
defend Proposition 8. If standing is granted on an individual injury theory,
it is difficult to identify a principled basis for granting standing to the
official sponsor of a ballot proposition, but denying it to the thousands of
individuals who made significant financial or other investments in the
proposition’s passage.
2. Associational Standing to Defend
The second theory of standing that ProtectMarriage.com asserted is an
associational standing theory. The Court in Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Advertising Commission 234 held that an organization seeking standing to
litigate on behalf of its members must show three things: “(a) its members
would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it
seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither
the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of
individual members in the lawsuit.”235
Although the second and third prongs of the Hunt test are likely
satisfied, 236 ProtectMarriage.com’s associational standing argument is
likely to fail the first prong, because it is difficult to envision an individual
230. Matthai Kuruvila, Mormons Denounced over Prop. 8, S.F. CHRONICLE, Oct. 27,
2008, at B1; Jesse McKinley & Kirk Johnson, Mormons Tipped Scale in Ban on Gay
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2008, at A1 (discussing five to seven-figure donations to the
“Yes on 8” campaign by various Mormon families).
231. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 & n.1.
232. Id. at 573–74.
233. Id.
234. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
235. Id. at 342–43 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511, 515 (1975)).
236. As to the second prong, “[t]he germaneness test is relatively loose,” and is satisfied
where the interests at issue are “pertinen[t]” to the organization’s purpose. Hazardous Waste
Treatment Council v. EPA, 861 F.2d 277, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Nathaniel B.
Edmonds, Associational Standing for Organizations with Internal Conflicts of Interest, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 351, 360 (2002) (providing additional context as to the germaneness test). The
third prong, too, is easily satisfied, so long as the organization’s individual members are not
seeking compensatory damages. Warth, 422 U.S. at 515.
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member who could establish standing in light of the prohibition on
generalized grievances.237 When an “asserted injury arises from the
government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of
someone else . . . standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily ‘substantially
more difficult’ to establish.” 238 A member’s mere concern with a social
issue is not enough to satisfy the standing requirement; there must be an
identifiable, concrete injury suffered by at least one member of the
organization. 239 No such injury is apparent here.
3. Quasi-legislative Standing to Defend
Finally, in addition to seeking standing in their individual capacities, the
initiative sponsors argued that they have authority under state law to
represent the interests of the People of the State of California.240 This
argument is based on the People’s reserved authority to exercise the
legislative power, and casts initiative sponsors as representatives of the
people, exercising delegated authority to represent the state’s own
interest. 241 ProtectMarriage.com argued that the unique nature of the
initiative process requires that sponsors be permitted to defend an initiative
measure, at least when state officials refuse to do so. 242 “[P]ermitting
official proponents to defend initiatives when public officials refuse to do
so vindicates the People’s initiative power,” and thereby ensures “‘the
people’s rightful control over their government.’” 243 A contrary rule, they
argued, would frustrate the provisions of the California constitution that
created the initiative process, by permitting recalcitrant elected officials to
effectively veto duly adopted initiatives.244
237. Standing does not exist when “the asserted harm is a ‘generalized grievance’ shared
in a substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens.” Warth, 422 U.S. at 499;
see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992).
238. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758 (1984)).
239. Warth, 422 U.S. at 515; see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363,
379 (1982) (finding standing where alleged injury was “far more than simply a setback to the
organization’s abstract social interests”).
240. Defendant-Intervenors-Appellants’ Opening Brief at 19, Perry v. Brown,
--- F.3d ----, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012), available at
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2010/09/22/10-16696_openingbrief.pdf. But
see Brief for Appellees, supra note 224, at 29.
241. Defendant-Intervenors-Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 240, at 19.
242. Id. at 21–22.
243. Defendant-Intervenors and Appellants’ Reply to Amicus Briefs at 4–5, Perry,
--- F.3d ----, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577 (certifying questions to No. S189476) (Cal. argued
Sept. 6, 2011), 2011 WL 2357942 (quoting Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 84 (Cal. 2009)).
244. See id. at 6–8 (arguing that because no public official has veto power over initiatives,
“it is doubtful . . . that such officials ‘may, consistent with the California Constitution,
achieve through a refusal to litigate what [they] may not do directly: effectively veto the
initiative by refusing to defend it or appeal a judgment invalidating it if no one else—
including the initiative’s proponents—is qualified to do so’”) (second alteration in original)
(internal citation omitted); see also CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 1. The U.S. Supreme Court has
linked the power to create laws with the power to defend them, which lends some credence
to ProtectMarriage.com’s argument. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65 (1986)
(“Because the State alone is entitled to create a legal code, only the State has the kind of
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Karcher v. May and a later case, factually very similar to the Proposition
8 litigation, provide insight into these arguments. In Karcher, as we have
seen, the Court accepted New Jersey’s representation that state law
permitted the legislature to defend the challenged law, and held that such a
state-conferred interest was sufficient for Article III standing. In Arizonans
for Official English v. Arizona, 245 the Court applied a similar analysis in a
case addressing the standing of the sponsors of a ballot proposition to
defend the measure against a federal constitutional challenge. 246 The Ninth
Circuit had held that the sponsors had standing in the same way that the
state legislators had standing in Karcher. 247
The Supreme Court in Arizonans vacated the opinion of the Court of
Appeals, and ultimately dismissed the case on abstention grounds, to permit
state courts to determine the nature of any interest that state law conferred
on ballot proposition sponsors. 248 Along the way, however, the Court
expressed “grave doubts” as to whether the intervenors had Article III
standing to appeal. 249 In particular, the Court expressed skepticism about
the sponsors’ assertion of a “quasi-legislative interest” that would support
standing, noting that the sponsors were neither elected by the people nor, as
in Karcher, appointed by state law “as agents of the people of Arizona to
defend, in lieu of public officials, the constitutionality of initiatives made
law of the State.” 250 Thus, the Court suggested that a state law authorizing
ballot proposition sponsors to represent the interests of the state would have
supported standing, as in Karcher, but it found no such state law on the
books. 251
Applying this analysis to the Proposition 8 litigation, it appears that the
state law question of whether initiative sponsors are authorized by
California law to represent the state’s interest in litigation concerning the
validity or enforcement of the measures they sponsor ought to dictate the
result of the federal standing question. The California Supreme Court held
in November 2011 that state law does confer the state’s interest in
defending an initiative on the sponsors thereof, at least where responsible
executive branch officials refuse to defend. 252 This state law rule, under the
holding in Karcher, confers on ProtectMarriage.com a sufficient stake in
the outcome to support Article III jurisdiction.253
As this Article went to press, the Ninth Circuit panel in Perry handed
down its decision, holding that ProtectMarriage.com did have standing to
‘direct stake’ identified in Sierra Club v. Morton . . . in defending the standards embodied in
that code.” (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972))).
245. 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
246. Id. at 64–67.
247. Id. at 65–66.
248. Id. at 74–76, 80.
249. Id. at 66.
250. Id. at 65.
251. See id. at 65–66.
252. See Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1020–25 (Cal. 2011).
253. See id.; see also Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72 (1987).
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appeal the district court’s judgment. 254 The panel’s decision exemplifies
the approach set forth in this Article. The panel asked the right question—
whether the intervenors had either a personal stake or the authority to assert
the state’s own interest—and thoughtfully analyzed the case law before
arriving at the correct conclusion. 255 But defendant standing all too
frequently escapes notice. Current doctrine provides inadequate, and at
times downright misleading, guidance to lower courts, which unsurprisingly
results in erroneous decisions, such as the incorrect decisions to permit
intervention in Windsor and other DOMA cases, and under-theorized
decisions, such as the initial intervention ruling by the district court in
Perry. A clearer understanding of standing—as a symmetrical requirement
of personal stake on both sides of the case—would facilitate better decision
making by simplifying the doctrine and pushing courts to give explicit
consideration to the various policies that the doctrine means to serve.
CONCLUSION
Current doctrine treats standing principally as a limitation on who may
sue. But case law, the text of Article III, and the policies underlying the
standing requirement all support the notion that, in every case, defendants
must also have a personal stake in the outcome. Recognizing that Article
III applies to defendants as well as plaintiffs would bring standing doctrine
into closer alignment with the results in many standing cases. No less
importantly, it would provide better guidance to lower courts regarding the
circumstances in which intervenor-defendants may be permitted to litigate
in federal court.

254. See Perry v. Brown, --- F.3d ----, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713, at
*7–9 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012).
255. See id. at *9–11.

